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Presumption of Innocence
or Presumption of Mercy?:
Weighing Two Western Modes of Justice
James Q. Whitman*
American criminal law has a deep commitment to the presumption of
innocence. Yet at the same time, American criminal justice is, by international
standards, extraordinarily harsh. This Article addresses this troubling state of
affairs. The Article contrasts the American approach with the approach of the
inquisitorial tradition of continental Europe. Inquisitorial justice, it argues,
has a less far-reaching presumption of innocence than American justice does.
Yet if continental justice puts less weight on the rights of the innocent, it puts
more on the rights of the guilty: while its presumption of innocence is
comparatively weaker, it has what can be called a strong presumption of
mercy. The continental approach produces forms of criminal procedure that
can shock Americans. Continental trial in particular often seems to American
observers to operate on a disturbing de facto presumption of guilt; the most
recent example is the high-profile trial of Amanda Knox. Yet the continental
approach has contributed to the making of a significantly more humane
criminal justice system than ours. Moreover, the continental approach is better
suited to cope with the rise of new forms of scientific investigation. The Article
pleads for a shift away from the American culture of rights for the innocent
toward a greater concern with continental-style rights for the guilty.
I. Introduction
Imagine two contrasting ideas of how to build a just system of criminal
justice. The first is oriented toward the presumption of innocence. It starts
from the belief that the gravest danger we face in criminal justice is the
danger that innocent persons will be arrested, prosecuted, and convicted.
Accordingly, it focuses on the threat of abusive investigations and
prejudicial trials-on the dangers posed by rogue cops, unprincipled
prosecutors, and biased judges and juries, all of whom threaten to
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undermine the liberties and the privacy of citizens. Committed to
combatting those dangers, this mode of justice invests in what Herbert
Packer famously called the "obstacle course" conception of due process: it
protects the interests of justice by making it maximally difficult for the state
to prove the case against defendants.' To that end, it makes it hard for
investigators to assemble evidence, and hard for prosecutors to manipulate
the jury. It offers far-reaching protections to those persons who are
suspected or accused. Once defendants have been duly convicted, however,
it does little to protect them. Its rights are rights for the innocent, not the
guilty.
The second, contrasting idea of how to build a just criminal justice
system is oriented instead toward a different presumption, a presumption of
mercy. This mode of justice does not treat the danger that innocent persons
will be convicted as the most pressing danger posed by the state. On the
contrary, it tends to operate on the workaday assumption that investigators
and judicial personnel are trustworthy professionals, and that virtually all
accused persons are guilty as charged. In consequence, it puts lesser weight
on due process protections for the accused. But hat does not mean that it
lacks rights: while this alternative mode of justice puts lesser weight on
protections for the innocent, it puts greater weight on protections for the
guilty. The most dangerous threat to justice, on this second view, is not the
state that engages in rogue investigations or unfair trials, but the state that
inflicts excessive punishment. The greatest fear is not that the innocent will
be convicted, but that the guilty will be treated in inhumane ways. By
erecting a presumption of mercy, this approach aims to force the justice
system to think carefully and work hard before it carries out a criminal
penalty.
These two modes of justice exist in the contemporary West, as this
Article aims to show. The first, the mode of justice oriented toward the
presumption of innocence, dominates in the criminal justice of the United
States. The second mode, oriented toward the presumption of mercy, is
much more powerfully present in the inquisitorial traditions of continental
Europe.
And of these two Western modes of justice, the first--our familiar,
American mode, oriented toward the presumption of innocence-is
troubled and increasingly fragile. The deep American attachment to what
Packer called the ideology of a "presumption of innocence"2 has failed to
create a humane criminal justice system. On the contrary, our tendency to
think of the interests of justice as interests in protecting the innocent, not
the guilty, has contributed to the making of an extraordinarily harsh culture
1. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models ofthe Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 13 (1964).
2. Id. at 12.
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of criminal punishment-one that threatens all of us, black and white, rich
and poor. Meanwhile, the rise of modern scientific evidence is making our
conception of due process more and more difficult to sustain. The
continental mode of justice, oriented more toward the presumption of
mercy, certainly has its dangers and shortcomings, but on balance it is
better suited to creating a just criminal justice order for the modern world.
Americans of goodwill should feel uneasy about our culture of the
presumption of innocence, and they should be prepared to ponder the
inquisitorial presumption of mercy with an open mind.
Those are my claims. I offer them at a moment when mercy is much
on the American agenda. There is a widespread sense of crisis in American
criminal justice-a sense on both the right and the left that our punishment
practices have spun out of control.3 In the face of this crisis, the President
4has made a point of making highly publicized use of his clemency power.
Meanwhile, scholars of criminal law are dividing into two hostile camps-
one advocating mercy,5 the other deploring it 6 -while at least one author
has published a bold argument against our strong American orientation
toward protecting the innocent as the road to the creation of a humane
system.7 My hope at this juncture is to bring a deeper understanding of the
workings of mercy in the law by looking beyond our borders to countries
where criminal justice has taken on less fearsome forms than it has here at
home. If there is something to learn from non-American justice, the time
has come to learn it.
3. E.g., Carl Hulse, Unlikely Cause Unites the Left and Right: Justice Reform, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/us/politics/unlikely-cause-unites-the-left-
and-the-right-justice-reform.html [https://perma.cc/KYE6-2TVR] (describing bipartisan advocacy
within the Coalition for Public Safety to overhaul the prison and justice systems); Colleen McCain
Nelson & Gary Fields, Obama, Koch Brothers in Unlikely Alliance to Overhaul Criminal Justice,
WALL STREET J. (July 16, 2015, 8:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-koch-brothers-in
-unlikely-alliance-to-overhaul-criminal-justice- 1437090737 [https://perma.cc/5Z93-BHHY]
(describing a collaboration between the Democratic White House and Republican donors to
reform federal sentencing laws and other aspects of the criminal justice system).
4. E.g., Peter Baker, Obama Plans Broader Use of Clemency to Free Nonviolent Drug
Offenders, N.Y. TIMEs (July 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/04/us/obama-plans-
broader-use-of-clemency-to-free-nonviolent-drug-offenders.html [https://perma.cc/7M3U-MHLE]
(arguing that President Obama is using his clemency power as part of a broader effort to correct
oversentencing).
5. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Restructuring Clemency: The Cost ofIgnoring
Clemency and a Plan for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (arguing that mercy should be a
priority for the office of the presidency under the pardon power).
6. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Obama's Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Decree, WALL STREET J.
(July 14, 2015, 7:28 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obamas-get-out-of-jail-free-decree
-1436916535 [https://perma.cc/F9S6-AB7G] (arguing that using clemency to override existing
policy on criminal sentences ets a dangerous precedent for presidential use of the pardon power).
7. See Daniel Epps, The Consequences ofError in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1110-21 (2015) (criticizing the criminal justice system's preference for false acquittals over false




II. Culture Clash in Criminal Justice
People in every part of the Western world agree on the same
proposition, banal but fundamental: A civilized society must impose limits
on the state in its conduct of criminal justice. That is equally true of both of
the great Western traditions that now dominate throughout most of the
globe-the adversarial tradition of the common law and the inquisitorial
tradition of continental Europe. It is easy to amass quotes from both the
common law countries and the Continent that warn of the dangers of
government abuses: unless we are vigilant, we hear in America, we may
find ourselves living in a "police state";8 there are pressing risks of
"repressive excess," official French documents remind us, that call for close
constitutional oversight of criminal justice;9 a society of the rule of law, we
read in the German newspapers, is a society that must keep the criminal
justice system in a judicial "corset";'0 and so on. But if we all agree that
government presents dangers, we differ over what those dangers are and
what sorts of limits to impose-so much so that Americans are sometimes
puzzled and even shocked by what goes on in inquisitorial Europe, while
Europeans can be equally puzzled and shocked by what goes on in
adversarial America.
Begin with what Americans find puzzling and shocking about the
inquisitorial systems of continental Europe. Much of it involves criminal
investigation. Suspicion of government investigators has been a constant in
American legal culture since the eighteenth century and today it is an
American commonplace that Fourth Amendment protections against the
threat of investigative abuses are essential-indeed "more essential than
ever," as Stephen Schulhofer proclaims-in the twenty-first age of high-
tech investigation." Safeguarding liberty, to us, begins with a healthy
distrust of government and most especially of government investigators.
Yet continental democracies like France, Germany, and Italy have
nothing quite like our Fourth Amendment. To be sure, continental
magistrates and police do not have carte blanche. There is quite a bit of
8. Sal Gentile, Are We Becoming a Police State? Five Things that Have Civil Liberties
Advocates Nervous, DAILY NEED (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/the
-daily-need/are-we-becoming-a-police-state-five-things-that-have-civil-liberties-advocates-
nervous/12563/ [http://perma.cc/Q2WU-M9XU].
9. CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL, DROIT PtNAL ET DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 2 (1998) (Fr.),
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionne/root/bankmm/pdflConseil/penal.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KZ98-CQ7C].
10. Ginter Bertram, Geschichte im Korsett des politischen Strafrechts: Meinungsfreiheit im
'freien Westen" [History in the Corset of Political Criminal Law: Freedom of Speech in the
"Free West'], 2010 DEUTSCHLAND JOURNAL 31, 39 (Ger.), http://www.deutschlandjournal.de/
Deutschland Journal - JahresauDeutschlandJournal-Jahresau/06Geschichte imKorsett des
_politischenStrafrechtsDJ2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/XR9Q-ZCL2].
11. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 180 (2012).
936 [Vol. 94:933
Weighing Two Western Modes of Justice
regulation of the investigative process in all of the continental countries,
and some of that regulation bears a resemblance to our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, at least on paper.12  Europeans certainly claim to be
concerned with putting limits on state investigators. Nevertheless, in
practice they are prepared to strike a pragmatic balance between reining in
investigators and seeking the full truth,13 and the result is that continental
investigators periodically engage in practices that seem to Americans
disturbingly out of line.
Take a few recent examples that have made their way into the
American press. In France, former President Nicolas Sarkozy was indicted
by investigating magistrates on the basis of wiretaps on conversations they
ordered between him and his lawyer. That news triggered a flurry of
American reports about the "sweeping powers" of French investigatorsl4
and the "disturbing" conduct of the "the French justice system."5 Isn 't
such casual disregard for attorney--client privilege, Americans ask,
worrisome? Other French cases that are sure to worry Americans have
recently hit the papers as well.'6 The Germans too can sometimes seem to
12. The European Court of Human Rights in particular has dedicated itself to keeping
criminal investigation within bounds, as have the national traditions. See Stephen C. Thaman,
Criminal Courts and Procedure, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIETY 235, 246-48 (David S.
Clark ed., 2012) (describing ways in which adversarial procedure has gradually replaced aspects
of the European inquisitorial model of criminal justice). Some of the reform efforts provoke
resistance from European police. See, e.g., Un syndicat policier denonce "I'alourdissement" de
la procidure pinale, 20 MINUTES (Jan. 29, 2014, 1:22 PM) (Fr.), http://www.20minutes.fr/france/
967347-20120706-syndicat-policier-denonce-l-alourdissement-procedure-penale [http://perma.cc/
YB94-68JT] (quoting French police officers denouncing increased criminal procedures).
13. This is a strong tendency accompanied by considerable discretion vested in judges. See
Sabine Gless, Germany: Balancing Truth Against Protected Constitutional Interests, in
EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW 113, 114-15 (Stephen C. Thaman ed., 2013) (for
German balancing); Giulio Illuminati, Italy: Statutory Nullities and Non-Usability, in
EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra, at 235, 237-38 (for Italian limitations on
exclusion); Jean Pradel, France: Procedural Nullities and Exclusion, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra, at 145, 152-53 (for French protection of the home). See also the
overall learned assessment of Professor Stephen C. Thaman, Balancing Truth Against Human
Rights: A Theory of Modern Exclusionary Rules, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE
LAW, supra, at 403.
14. A Scandal Tainting Both Sides, ECONOMIST (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
news/europe/21599064-nicolas-sarkozys-political-comeback-endangered-scandal-tainting-both-
sides [http://perma.cc/7MWZ-CTXH].
15. Marc Champion, Eavesdropping on Sarkozy, BLOOMBERGVIEW (July 4, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-07-04/eavesdropping-on-sarkozy [http://perma.cc/
6BNM-BATD].
16. Notably a mass DNA sweep in La Rochelle conducted under the threat that
noncooperators would simply be arrested. See Pauline Boyer, Viol & La Rochelle: "On se dit qu'il
y a un pridateur parmi nous, " LE FIGARO.FR (Apr. 14, 2014, 11:42 AM) (Fr.),
http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2014/04/14/01016-20140414ARTFIG00087-viol-a-la
-rochelle-on-se-dit-qu-il-y-a-un-predateur-parmi-nous.php [http://perma.cc/3MNL-TC2T]
(describing French reactions to a justice ordering DNA testing of 527 men present at the time a
student was raped). No perpetrator was identified. Viol d'une lyceenne i La Rochelle: les tests
2016] 937
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Americans alarmingly insensitive to basic Fourth Amendment imperatives.
German investigators make heavy use of electronic surveillance-
including, notoriously, a police Trojan Horse program17-and even
outrageous abuses do not necessarily result in suppression of evidence.8
"Europe won't save you[!]," wams one site about German investigative
practices, your "e-mail is probably safer in the U.S."l 9 Not least, there is a
hotly discussed Italian example from a case that I will touch on throughout
this Article: the sensational trial of Amanda Knox, the Seattle exchange
student charged with an ugly murder in the small Italian city of Perugia in
2007. In the course of an intense public-relations battle over her guilt,
Knox's parents alleged that police interrogators had coerced their daughter
into falsely incriminating herself.20  The consequence was that they
themselves were indicted for criminal defamation of the police!21 What
kind offree country, Americans ask, brings a criminal prosecution against
people because they have the temerity to raise questions about a police
investigation? Is liberty really safe in a society where such things go on?
But it is not just inquisitorial criminal investigation that can
occasionally make Americans shake their heads. The same is also true-
even more true-of inquisitorial trial procedure. American trial procedure
is founded on a careful bifurcation of the criminal trial into the guilt phase
and the sentencing phase.22 During the initial guilt phase, American law
ADN nigatifs, LE MONDE (May 21, 2014, 7:32 PM) (Fr.), http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/
2014/05/2 1/viol-d-une-lyceenne-a-la-rochelle-les-test-adn-negatifs 4423264_3224.html [http://
perma.cc/XY63-9SJ5].
17. Monika Ermert, Brief German Police Used Trojan Horses in Investigations, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.ip-watch.org/2011/10/10/german-police-used-trojan
-horses-in-investigations/ [http://perna.cc/Sz6P-A23N].
18. In general, German investigations are subject to proportionality limits. See CHRISTIAN
JAGER, BEWEISVERWERTUNG UND BEWEISVERWERTUNGSVERBOTE IM STRAFPROZESS 4-12
(2003) (Ger.). For the application of these principles to the Trojan Horse program, see Frederik
Obermaier & Pascal Paukner, Bundestrojaner ist einsatzbereit, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (Aug. 15,
2014, 12:29 AM) (Ger.), http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/online-ueberwachung
-bundestrojaner-ist-einsatzbereit-1.2090112 [https://perma.cc/QG2P-RWZG]. For earlier liter-
ature, see Joachim Bohnert, Ordnungsvorschrifien im Strafverfahren, 1982 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT
FUR STRAFRECHT 5 (Ger.); and Hans-Joachim Rudolphi, Revisibilitat von Verfahrensmdngeln im
Strafproze3, in MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT 93 (1970) (Ger.).
19. Cyrus Farivar, Europe Won't Save You: Why E-Mail is Probably Safer in the US, ARS
TECHNICA (Oct. 13, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/10/europe-wont
-save-you-why-e-mail-is-probably-safer-in-the-us/2/ [http://perma.cc/NE4W-GFRR].
20. Stacy Meichtry, Italian Judge Indicts Amanda Knox's Parents, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 15,
2011, 4:54 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748703312904576146641422780606 [https://perma.cc/759U-3SFM].
21. Doug Longhini, Amanda Knox's Parents to Go on Trial in Perugia, CBS NEws (Mar. 20,
2012, 11:49 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/amanda-knoxs-parents-to-go-on-trial-in-perugia
[http://perma.cc/6HDV-LJC6].
22. See Nancy J. King, How Different Is Death? Jury Sentencing in Capital and Non-Capital
Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 195 n.l (2004) (noting that while "[a]ll jurisdictions
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imposes severe limitations on the sorts of evidence the state can present
against the defendant.23 Even if the accused is a monster, we believe, he
must be declared innocent if he did not commit the crime at issue; that
means that the jury must be kept from hearing "prejudicial" facts about him
if at all possible.24 Such facts may be considered during the sentencing
phase2 5 -- but only during the sentencing phase, after the defendant has been
convicted and the jurors dismissed. Any deviation from this foundational
evidentiary principle, Americans believe, will manifestly deny the
defendant a fair trial, and will dangerously undermine the presumption of
innocence. In America, we put people on trial for the crime with which
they are charged, not for everything they have ever done.26 That seems to
us a bedrock principle of civilized justice.
Yet inquisitorial procedure does not respect the bedrock distinction
between guilt and sentencing phases! An inquisitorial trial serves both to
determine guilt and to pass sentence in a single combined proceeding-and
that means that character evidence relevant to sentencing gets aired in open
court before the defendant has been formally adjudicated guilty. During the
very opening minutes of a French or German trial, the presiding judge, to
the dismay of Americans, questions the accused about the "course of his life
before the crime with which he has been charged," while the jurors (in
France) or the lay assessors (in Germany and Italy) look on.27 The
authorizing capital punishment bifurcate the capital trial," "[]ury trials are bifurcated in five of the
six states that authorize jury sentencing in non-capital cases").
23. See generally ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EvIDENCE LAW (3d ed. 2011) (describing the many
evidence rules and exceptions that apply in American criminal and civil trials).
24. E.g., id. § 5.04, at 129 (explaining that the general ban on using evidence to establish a
character trait is rooted in a fear that the evidence will be too prejudicial).
25. E.g., Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1227, 1268 (2001) (outlining what factors may be considered during sentencing, including
evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts").
26. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87 COLUM. L.
REv. 920, 961-62 (1987).
27. KLAUS HALLER & KLAUS CONZEN, DAS STRAFVERFAHREN: EINE SYSTEMATISCHE
DARSTELLUNG MIT ORIGINALAKTE UND FALLBEISPIELEN §§ 391-92, at 175-76 (7th ed. 2014)
(Ger.) (advocating "Vernehmung des Angeklagten zur Sache, [interrogation of the accused as to
the substance of the case,]" with "Erdrterung des Vorlebens und persdnlichen Werdegangs
[consideration of past history and personal process]" and then "Angaben zum eigentlichen
Tatgeschehen. [details of the actual crime.]" "Der Umfang der Vernehmung zur Person, also zum
Lebensweg, richtet sich nach Umfang und Bedeutung des Anklagevorwurfs. Weist der
Werdegang Auffdlligkeiten auf-etwa padophile Neigungen, psychiatrische oder
psychotherapeutische Behandlungen-so gebietet es die Aufkldrungspflicht, diesen Umstainden
nachzugehen. [The life course of the accused, focusing on the extent and seriousness of the
accusation. If the personal history should show anomalies-such as paedophilic tendencies,
psychiatric or psychotherapeutic treatments-the duty of disclosure dictates that these
circumstances be taken into account]"); GASTON STtFANI, GEORGES LEVASSEUR & BERNARD
BOULOC, PROCtDURE PtNALE § 860, at 857 (22d ed. 2010) (Fr.) (describing the opening
interrogation of the accused by the prosecutor as follows: "S'inspirant g6n6ralement de
l'interrogatoire d6finitif auquel le juge d'instruction aura procdd6, le prdsident retrace la vie de
2016] 939
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courtroom revelations about the defendant may include a host of damaging
and discreditable facts, such as that he plays hooky from school,2 8 skips out
on work,29 drinks too much,3 0 or has pedophilic tendencies. Meanwhile,
there is at best limited respect for American practices of constitutional
evidence suppression.32 In the Knox case, for example, the Italian lay
assessors were permitted to hear the highly incriminating statement she had
given to the police---even though that statement had been technically
suppressed as a matter of Italian constitutional criminal procedure.33
American commentators were aghast.3 4 Nor do the inquisitorial countries
have a tradition of vigorous cross-examination. There is nothing exactly
like our confrontation clause jurisprudence in continental Europe, as our
Supreme Court regularly asserts. Continental defense attorneys certainly
l'accus6 jusqu'aux faits reproch6s, et le ddroulement de ceux-ci; il proc~de par voie de questions,
mais l'accus6 ne tient souvent qu'un r6le mineur dans ce dialogue. [Loosely following the formal
interrogation conducted by the examining magistrate, the presider retraces the life of the accused
before the alleged offences, and how they occurred; he proceeds by posing questions, but the
accused often plays only a minor role in this dialogue.]").
28. Reinhard Granderath, Getilgt aber nicht vergessen: Das Verwertungsverbot des
Bundeszentralregistergesetzes, 18 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 319, 320 (1985) (Ger.)
("Schuleschwainzen, Weglaufen vom Arbeitsplatz, Vernachlassigung der Familie, fortgesetzter
Alkholomi8brauch oder eine sonstige tadelnswerte Lebensfthrung in Zumsammenhang mit der
Tat. [Truancy, absconding from work, family neglect, continued alcohol abuse or other
reprehensible lifestyles in connection with the crime.]").
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. HALLER & CONZEN, supra note 27, § 392, at 176. See also the accounts in DETLEV
BURHOFF, HANDBUCH FOR DIE STRAFRECHTLICHE HAUPTVERHANDLUNG 444-47 (5th ed. 2007)
(prior convictions); id. at 921-28 (questioning of defendant); MICHAEL HEGHMANNS & UWE
SCHEFFLER, HANDBUCH ZUM STRAFVERFAHREN 673-78 (2008) (describing why a defendant
would accept punishment silently when accused of alcoholism and other embarrassing
characteristics).
32. For an introduction into the various factors that determine the admissibility of evidence,
see the discussion of balancing in Gless, supra note 13, at 114. For a classic discussion, see
Mirjan Damalka, Atomistic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence: A Comparative View, in
COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 92 (David S. Clark ed., 1990).
33. The admission of her statement was possible because the Italian system, like other
continental systems, permits the attachment of a civil suit to a criminal trial-in this case the civil
defamation suit brought against Knox by Diya Lumumba, who was initially charged with the
murder of Meredith Kercher on the strength of Knox's false statement. The procedural
background is explained in Julia Grace Mirabella, Note, Scales of Justice: Assessing Italian
Criminal Procedure Through the Amanda Knox Trial, 30 B.U. INT'L L.J. 229, 241-42 (2012).
34. Id.
35. See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1650 (2009)
(discussing the history of cross-examinations in England and America). But of course the
question is far more complicated. Cf Art. Ill Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (affording the right to
confront one's accuser); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (affording the same right).
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speak up on behalf of their clients, sometimes forcefully, but it is by no
means unusual to see them conduct themselves in a deferential and even
meek manner.36
Criminal procedure in Europe can involve wiretaps of conversations
between lawyers and their clients; defamation prosecutions targeting critics
of the police; defendants grilled in open court about their "course of life"
before they have been found guilty; and reticent defense counsel.
Encounters like these with contemporary continental justice leave
Americans disoriented and uneasy; a trip to a continental courtroom is
likely to reinforce the darkest suspicions that Americans harbor about the
inquisitorial tradition-the sorts of suspicions that multiplied when Knox
was initially convicted in a decision that seemed to put all the focus on her
allegedly debauched "course of life" rather than on hard evidence of her
guilt for the murder with which she was charged. The same sorts of
suspicions have given rise to the spirit of "anti-inquisitorialism," in the
words of David Sklansky, that increasingly pervades our Supreme Court
jurisprudence on criminal procedure.38 Few Americans would conclude
that contemporary continental countries are unbridled tyrannies of, say, the
Fascist or Communist type. Certainly German or French justice does not
seem as disturbing to Americans as justice in places like the Kyrgyz
Republic,39 or Laos,40 or China.41 Nevertheless, from the American point of
36. For example, see the French documentary portraying a French murder trial, L'Affaire
Delnatte, Justice en France (Le Cinq television broadcast June 12, 1991), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9ttrUx-5tE [https://perma.cc/KL7Z-EKGH] (beginning at minute
11:58) (Fr.).
37. See the fuller discussion in the Appendix, infra.
38. Sklansky, supra note 35, at 1668 ("Anti-inquisitorialism is. . . a broad and longstanding
theme of American criminal procedure, and if anything it has grown more pronounced in recent
years.").
39. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR,
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 8 (2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/220607.pdf [http://perma.cc/4NAE-3YKW] ("While the law provides for defendants'
rights, including the presumption of innocence, the government regularly violated these rights.").
40. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, LAOS
5, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186495.pdf [http://perma.cc/S37X-KD9E] ("By
law defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, but in practice judges usually decided guilt or
innocence in advance, basing their decisions on the result of police or prosecutorial investigation
reports.").
41. E.g., Chris Buckley, China Aims to Abolish Goals for Arrests and Convictions, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/world/asia/china-said-to-be-doing
-away-with-goals-for-arrests-and-convictions.html [https://perma.cc/manage/vest/GV6P-97HK];
Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, Presumed Guilty in China's War on Corruption, Targets Suffer
Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/world/asia/the-new
-victims-of-chinas-war-on-corruption [http://perma.cc/GV6P-97HK] (reporting that an individual
signed a confession after being beaten, starved, and interrogated for days).
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view the law of continental Europe does look suspiciously insensitive to
some of the basic demands of justice, and at times perilously supine in the
face of state investigative and prosecutorial power.
But if Americans shudder when they are exposed to continental
practices, the same is true the other way around: We shock them too. Much
of what shocks continental observers has to do with the American
punishment system, which is often described in Europe as "barbarous.A2
Capital punishment is of course the most famous example of such American
state "barbarism," but it is by no means the only one. American
incarceration rates are, notoriously, the highest of any OECD country-
higher than in Russia and South Africa, both of which used to beat us out.4 3
Certainly they are spectacularly higher than the rates in Western Europe."
Meanwhile, American prisoners benefit from few or none of the dignitary
protections that are regarded as indispensable in Europe.4 5 You may enjoy
more far-reaching evidentiary protections in an American courtroom than in
a continental one, but once you are convicted, the American state is much
more likely to condemn you to years, decades, or even life in a violent and
degrading prison with limited hope of parole, or no hope at all.
Nor does continental shock end with the American punishment system.
American criminal legislation and adjudication offend fundamental
European principles as well. Take the example of strict and vicarious
criminal liability. Continental criminal law rests on the rigorous application
of the principle of personal responsibility: to continental Europeans, it
42. E.g., Marc Pitzke, Brutale Hinrichtungen: Immer mehr US-Bundesstaaten wollen
Todesstrafe abschaffen, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Jan. 26, 2014, 1:31 PM) (Ger.), http://www.spiegel.de/
panorama/justiz/usa-bundesstaaten-schaffen-todesstrafe-nach-brutalen-hinrichtungen-ab-a-945270
.html [http://perma.cc/T75X-FV85]; Faustine Saint Gdnibs, Exdcution en Oklahoma: "La peine de
mort, c'est la barbarie" denonce Badinter, PUB. SENAT (Apr. 30, 2014, 2:56 PM) (Fr.),
http://www.publicsenat.fr/lcp/politique/execution-oklahoma-peine-mort-c-barbarie-denonce
-badinter-562877 [https://perma.cc/5X9J-HHXU]; Maximilian Steinbeis, USA: Lebenslang fir
Jugendliche-Ende iner barbarischen Strafrechtspraxis?, VERFASSUNGSBLOG ON MATTERS
CONSTITUTIONAL (Nov. 9, 2009) (Ger.), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/usa-lebenslang-fur
-jugendliche-ende-einer-barbarischen-strafrechtspraxis/#.VkjOg9-rSu5 [http://perma.cc/7QN6
-7MA5] (for a practice now abandoned after Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which
held that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the
time of their crime violates the Eighth Amendment).
43. Michael Toury, Crime and Criminal Justice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3, 17-19 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011).
44. See, e.g., Highest to Lowest - Prison Population Rate, WORLD PRISON BRIEF,
http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison population rate?field region taxonomy
tid=22 [http://perma.cc/FGL242EA] (showing comparative figures by country).
45. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 9 (2003).
[Vol. 94:933942
2016] Weighing Two Western Modes of Justice 943
seems elementary that in a civilized country offenders can only be
criminally convicted for acts they themselves have committed with a
culpable state of mind.46 That, they would say, is a bedrock principle of
* 47civilized justice.
Yet American criminal law is rife with doctrines of strict and vicarious
liability, notably in areas like the law of felony murder and conspiracy, and
those doctrines are energetically exploited by American prosecutors48 (and
sententiously endorsed by American judges49 ). In America you can be
punished for an act you had no culpable intention of committing, for harm
that you had no culpable intention of causing, or even for an act committed
by someone else.o When Europeans learn about these American doctrines
and practices, they see, once again, barbarism.5 I How can any civilized
46. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 15 (Ger.), translation at https://www
.gesetze-im-intemet.de/englisch stgb/german criminal_code.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P9J-KZ46]
("Strafbar ist nur vorsitzliches Handeln, wenn nicht das Gesetz fahrlassiges Handeln ausdricklich
mit Strafe bedroht. [Unless the law expressly provides for criminal liability based on negligence,
only intentional conduct shall give rise criminal liability.]"); see also KRISTIAN KOHL,
STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 78-79 (4th ed. 2002) (Ger.) (discussing StGB § 15); WALTER
GROPP, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 67-69 (3d ed. 2005) (Ger.) (basing discussion on
human dignity). For the French perspective, see JEAN PRADEL, MANUEL DE DROIT PtNAL
GtNERAL 461-62 (15th ed. 2004); LINE TEILLOT & PASCALE URBANSKY, DROIT PENAL
GtNERAL 76-77 (2008) (Fr.).
47. See James Gordley, Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and Contract for the Unforeseeable
Consequences of an Intentional Wrong: A Once and Future Rule?, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
175, 176 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1998) (contrasting Italian and American responses to
rules in their own bodies of law holding defendants liable for some acts they had not intended to
commit).
48. Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict Liability, 62 DUKE
L.J. 285, 332 (2012) (observing that incarceration rates between the United States and Europe had
roughly tracked one another through the 1960s, but that American rates approximately quintupled
in the period between the 1970s and the 2000s); Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the
Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 585, 598 (2008) (noting American
prosecutors' increasing use of Pinkerton liability beginning in the 1970s).
49. See Brown, supra note 48, at 324-25 (finding that the rationale judges regularly invoke
for strict liability interpretations is the idea that no proof of culpability is required beyond that
needed to ensure that an actor is not convicted for purely innocent conduct); see also Andrew
Ashworth & Meredith Blake, The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal Law, 1996
CRIM. L. REV. 306, 316-17 (discussing the connection between strict liability and the burden of
proof).
50. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946) (upholding the conviction of
the defendant for acts of a coconspirator made in furtherance of the conspiracy); GUYORA
BINDER, FELONY MURDER 28 (2012) ("[A] felony murder law is simply a law conditioning
murder liability on unintended killing in the commission or attempt of a felony."). The absence of
conspiracy law in non-common law, and especially non-American common law, traditions came
to the fore most recently in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006). The American
tendency to use conspiracy law as a means of dealing with terrorism creates erious tension on the
international scene.
51. JEAN PRADEL, DROIT PENAL COMPARE 95 (3d ed. 2008) (objecting to felony murder
doctrine); Gordley, supra note 47, at 175-83; Katja Gelinsky, Jeden Tag eine b6se Tat,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (Dec. 5, 2009) (Ger.), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/
wirtschaftspolitik/amerikanisches-strafrecht-jeden-tag-eine-boese-tat- 1899813.html
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society punish one person for an act committed by another? Here it is the
Europeans who shudder. As we shall see, there are other examples of
American doctrines that shock the continental conscience.
Even the guarantees of American criminal trial seem patently
inadequate to continental jurists. Europeans insist that any person charged
with an offense carrying a serious penalty must be afforded a trial. 2 Doing
so seems to them a minimum requirement of a just order. Americans, by
contrast, tolerate a system in which even life imprisonment may be imposed
as the result of a mere plea bargain, and in which full-scale trials have
become vanishingly rare events.
So from either shore we gaze across the Atlantic in dismay (and no
doubt self-satisfaction). How did it come to pass that conceptions of
fundamental justice differ so much in countries that share such a deep
commitment to curbing abuses of state power and that share so much of
their Western cultural heritage as well?
III. Presumption of Innocence/Presumption of Mercy
Our standard comparative law literature has no satisfying answer to
give. The literature commonly takes a familiar line in describing the
contrast between them and us: the fundamental tension at work, our
literature explains, is the tension between the protection of rights and the
pursuit of the truth. The American adversarial system puts the emphasis on
due process rights, suppressing and excluding evidence even at the cost of
having "trials without truth."54 The Europeans, by contrast, are reluctant to
[http://perma.cc/UG5C-CXCY] (describing American strict liability offenses); Bastian Fresca,
Leser-Kommentar, Felony Murder Rule?, FocuS (Apr. 14, 2014, 7:04 PM) (Ger.),
http://www.focus.de/panorama/welt/felony-murder-rule-harsche-us-rechtsprechung-kommentar
id_5703638.html [http://perma.cc/X4X4-N383] (confused account with denunciation of
Americans as "barbarians"); cf DENIS SALAS, LA VOLONTI DE PUNIR: ESSAI SUR LE POPULISME
PENAL 118-20 (2005) (arguing that irrational dangerousness calculus has swamped mens rea
focus in American criminal justice). It is important to observe that the law of complicity presents
complications that open the possibility of various forms of vicarious liability in all systems. For
French conspiracy law, see, for example, CODE PENAL [C. PtN.] art. 121-7 (Fr.), translation at
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1 957/13715/version/4/file/Code 33.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y4TB-EL32]. Nevertheless, as the French observe, the French sentencing
regime leaves ample room for distinguishing accomplices from principals. Still, close study of the
application of the law of complicity might reveal more continental willingness to countenance
forms of strict and vicarious liability in practice than continental authorities are prepared to
acknowledge. Indeed, as I will suggest below, continental practices permit means of dealing sub
rosa with questions of dangerousness that are effectively dealt with in the United States through
doctrines of strict and vicarious liability.
52. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
53. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PLEA AND CHARGE
BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY 1 (2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/
PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KWB-EEZ8] (noting that of the 75,573
cases disposed of in federal district court by trial or plea, 95% were disposed of by a guilty plea).
54. WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH 25 (1999).
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sacrifice investigative fact-finding efficiency on the altar of rights; they
believe too deeply in the imperative of establishing the whole truth for that.
Europeans insist on an inquiry into the whole truth: that is why they are
called "inquisitorial" while we are called "adversarial."55 (There is another,
more philosophically abstract version of the argument as well: the common
law tradition, scholars sometimes say, has a history of treating defendants
as subjects, the bearers of rights; whereas the continental tradition has a
history of treating them as mere objects.)5 6  For most commentators, the
implication is that inquisitorial Europeans have lessons to learn from the
adversarial Americans about protecting the due process rights of the
accused-though for some, the implication is that Americans should learn
from the Europeans to take off the investigative gloves.57
That familiar account of the differences between inquisitorial and
adversarial values is certainly not completely off base. It is indeed the case,
for the most part, that continental systems are more rigorously committed
to getting to the truth through professional investigative techniques, and
accordingly less solicitous of American-style due process rights.
Nevertheless, focusing on the tension between truth-seeking and rights-
protection is by no means sufficient. Yes, the Europeans want to get the
whole truth. But it would be deeply mistaken to imagine that they care only
about fact-finding efficiency and not about rights. The Europeans most
certainly do care about rights. If they did not care about rights, they would
not be shocked by the aspects of American justice that shock them. What
matters is that their understanding of the rights at stake is different from
ours.
55. See Thaman, supra note 12, at 248 (contrasting the inquisitorial "search for the truth" with
the rights alternative associated with the adversarial tradition).
56. See, e.g., 1 JULIO B. J. MAIER, DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL 314-15 (2d ed. 2004) (Spain)
(discussing impact of a 1670 French ordinance on the development of continental tradition).
57. For a discussion of the classic rights versus truth account of Comparative Criminal
Procedure, including a welcome expression of skepticism, see generally Miximo Langer & Kent
Roach, Rights in the Criminal Process: A Case Study of Convergence and Disclosure Rights, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 273 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2013). It is
important to see this interpretive tradition in comparative law in its historical context. The
idealization of common law rights extends back to the anglomanie of the eighteenth century, and
in some sense as far back as Fortescue. Nevertheless, the modem American literature took shape
against the background of American debates over the due process revolution, with the result that
scholars tended to interpret the contrast between our system and the European alternatives as a
contrast between a due process order and a less hampered investigative order. The most important
figure in this regard is John Langbein, whose critique of the complexity of due-process-oriented
American trials can be found, for example, in John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea-Bargaining:
How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 206 (1979). For a brilliant classic precursor, see
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 166 (K.J.M.
Smith ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2014) (1863) ("[T]he inquisitorial theory of criminal procedure is
beyond all question the true one. It is self-evident that a trial ought to be a public inquiry into the
truth of a matter . . . .").
58. But see infra note 211 and accompanying text.
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We need an account that focuses squarely on how our conceptions of
rights differ, and that is what this Article aims to offer. Our conceptions of
rights differ, it aims to show, in ways that must be seen against the
background of the contrast between two cultural orientations in criminal
law: on the one hand, an orientation toward our familiar presumption of
innocence, focused on the rights of the innocent; on the other hand, an
orientation toward what I propose to call the "presumption of mercy,"
focused on the rights of the guilty.
The phrase "presumption of mercy" is certainly unfamiliar. Existing
legal systems do not use it; it is my own invention. Readers may object that
it is wrong to describe European systems with a phrase that Europeans do
not use themselves.59  Nevertheless, I am convinced that a great deal of
what we find mutually shocking can best be understood if we recognize the
value of this admittedly unfamiliar legal concept. More than that, I believe
that it can help us gain insight into some dilemmas of modem criminal
justice everywhere.
Since the concept "presumption of mercy" is unfamiliar, though, a few
preliminary clarifications are in order. First, it is important to dispel one
natural misunderstanding: A system oriented toward a presumption of
mercy is not a system that refuses to punish. A presumption of mercy is
simply a presumption-a presumption that offenders will be spared, or
subjected to milder punishment, if appropriate. All presumptions can be
overcome, and that is true of this one as well. The presumption of mercy
does not bar punishing the guilty any more than the presumption of
innocence bars convicting the accused. It simply forces justice officials to
work hard in order to justify the decision to punish, just as the presumption
of innocence is designed to force justice officials to work hard in order to
justify the decision to convict; and once the presumption of mercy is
overcome, the criminal justice system may well impose tough sentences.
Both orientations create presumptions for the same reason: imposing
criminal punishment is a morally fraught business, which tests our
conscience. We have a deep fear of making mistakes, and so we create
59. The methodological questions are important-though I think not important enough to
merit sustained discussion in the text. It is true that "presumption of mercy" is not only unknown
in European law, but difficult to render in European languages. (The best choice may be Latin:
praesumptio clementiae as contrasted with praesumptio innocentiae; this would yield the French
prisomption de clemence/prisomption d'innocence. It is not easy to construct a corollary for the
German Unschuldsvermutung; perhaps one could revive the expression Gnadengebot). If our task
is simply to give a faithful account of how foreign systems are understood by those who operate
within them, this Article is a misguided enterprise. Nevertheless, I resist that view of our task,
even in the compelling version presented by William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence
(7): What Was It Like to Try a Rat, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1889 (1995). I think that it is possible to
grasp dynamics of the law in ways that depart from familiar descriptions, but that are nevertheless
revealing. Readers, European and American, will have to judge for themselves whether the
Article succeeds in the effort.
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procedural presumptions that will force us to justify our decisions with care
and suitable deliberation. But the two orientations conceive of the risks of
mistake attendant on criminal punishment differently. The first kind of
presumption is designed to counter the risk that we will sin by inflicting
punishment on those who are in fact innocent, while the second is designed
to counter the risk that we will sin by mistreating those who are in fact
guilty.
Second, the contrast that I wish to sketch out is not just a contrast
between two technical rules. It is the contrast between two larger cultural
orientations in the law. American cultural allegiance to the presumption of
innocence extends beyond the technical courtroom rule putting the burden
of proof on the state. "[O]ur generally accepted ideology of a presumption
of innocence,"o to repeat Packer's phrase, shapes American legal culture
much more broadly than that: We share an almost instinctive orientation
that rests on the belief that the most serious threat to justice is the threat that
the innocent will be targeted.6 1  The impact of that orientation is felt
throughout American criminal law, not just in courtroom respect for the
technical presumption of innocence.62
In much the same way, the orientation toward the presumption of
mercy extends beyond technical rules requiring mitigation of punishment.
It belongs to a much broader continental cultural pattern whose sources lie
ultimately in a hierarchical, paternalistic understanding of justice. Mirjan
Damaika famously argued that continental justice assumes a hierarchical
structure of authority;63 we see just such a structure of authority in the
strong continental orientation toward mercy: In line with the hierarchical
sensibility, continental legal practices rest broadly on the belief that justice
officials have a "paternalistic obligation to protect the defendant."64
Third, when I say that the clash between our legal cultures ought to be
seen against the background of the dichotomy between these two
contrasting orientations, I do not mean that there is some simple equation to
be drawn between American law and the culture of the presumption of
innocence, or between continental law and the culture of the presumption of
mercy. It is not the case that American criminal justice turns exclusively on
the presumption of innocence, nor that the continental traditions turn
exclusively on the presumption of mercy. All the legal cultures of the
60. Packer, supra note 1, at 11.
61. Id.
62. PIZZI, supra note 54, at 46-68 (surveying the evidentiary hurdles that American
prosecutors have to cope with when attempting to bring a case against a criminally accused
individual).
63. Mirjan Damaika, Structures ofAuthority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE
L.J. 480, 487 (1975).
64. William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adversarial Trial
System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 429, 449 (2004).
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Atlantic world are products of complex histories in which the two threads
are interwoven. The continental traditions, in particular, most certainly do
include a presumption of innocence. My aim is only to show that the
presumption of mercy stands out much more prominently in the fabric of
modem day continental justice. There is no necessary absolute choice
between either the presumption of innocence or the presumption of mercy;
but it is the case that the presumption of mercy has proven more at home in
the continental world.
Nor is that surprising: for as I will emphasize, fourthly, the two
orientations are rooted in different political sensibilities. Indeed, it is
essential that we recognize that the two presumptions are at home in two
different political cultures. The presumption of innocence fits comfortably
within an antistatist, classic liberal sensibility of the kind we so often
encounter in American law. By contrast, the presumption of mercy fits
more comfortably within a statist sensibility, informed by deference to the
authority and expertise of government officials.
It is nothing new to say that differences in political culture lie in the
background of our differences in criminal procedure: in particular, it is a
commonplace that the relative passivity of the common law judge and the
relative autonomy of the common law jury reflect traditions of common law
resistance to strong assertions of government authority.6 5  But it is
important to recognize that the importance of political culture extends
beyond these well-worn questions of the power of judge and jury. Political
culture also has a fundamental impact on the understanding of a basic
problem in criminal law analysis that is centrally important for this Article:
how to decide which offenders to classify as "innocent."
Innocence is, after all, not a self-explanatory concept. There is more
than one way of determining which defendants should count as "innocent."
In particular, when we have deserving offenders before us-those who have
some excuse or justification to offer in their defense-we can choose to
deem them either "innocent" or "guilty but forgiven"; we can opt either for
exculpation or for mercy. For example, if individuals kill in self-defense,
we can opt either to acquit them (as is the case in modern Western
systemS66), or to convict them but then pardon them (as was frequently the
case in earlier centuries67).
65. For an example, with reference to the Knox case, see Mirabella, supra note 33, at 250-51.
66. C. PEN., supra note 51, art. 122-5 (Fr.); STGB, supra note 46, § 32 (Ger.).
67. See 4 WLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 184 (observing that where a killing was
the result of self-defense, a general verdict of acquittal was usually permitted by English judges of
the time); NAOMI HURNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE A.D. 1307, at 1 (1969)
(discussing the king's authority to grant pardons in the Anglo-Saxon era); Elizabeth Papp Kamali,
A Felonious State of Mind: Mens Rea in Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century England 1 (2015)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with Texas Law Review) (noting
that under twelfth-century English law, a homicide judgment often allowed jurors to decide
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It should be obvious that the choice we make between these two
options has significant implications for the place of criminal justice within
the larger political order of a given society. Mercy, the practice of
declaring offenders "guilty but forgiven," is closely associated with
assertions of strong state authority. Thus monarchical systems of justice
always made heavy use of discretionary royal mercy before the nineteenth
century and continue to make heavy use of mercy today. The Thai and
Saudi monarchies, for example, make ostentatious use of pardons. For
that matter, the Nazis did too. (For example, there was a general amnesty
for low-level offenders on the occasion of Hitler's birthday.)69 States that
claim extensive authority often maintain that authority in part through
displays of mercy.
By contrast, exculpation-the practice of declaring deserving
offenders "innocent"-comports with an antistatist approach to criminal
justice. If we declare our deserving offenders "innocent," we declare them
to be immune as a matter of principle to the state's punishment power,
regardless of whether the state chooses to punish or pardon.
Correspondingly, when lawyers and legislators develop doctrines of
exculpation that permit verdicts of "innocent," they are doing more than
just exploring the dictates of moral philosophy, as most professors of
criminal law like to think of themselves as doing. They are engaging in a
form of juristic politics, erecting tacit doctrinal barriers against the assertion
of state power.
It should be clear that opting for exculpation rather than mercy is in
deep harmony with an orientation toward the presumption of innocence. If
we declare the class of deserving offenders "innocent" rather than "guilty
but forgiven," we bias the system in favor of finding more defendants
technically "innocent." We create, not precisely a presumption of
innocence, but a kindred bias toward verdicts of innocence. Choosing to
declare deserving offenders "guilty but forgiven," by contrast, is obviously
more in tune with the presumption of mercy. Instead of swelling the ranks
of those who will be deemed "innocent," it puts the focus on the question of
whether it is right to go easy on some of those found "guilty" or,
conversely, right to subject some of them to stiffer sentences because they
represent more of a danger to society.
whether to "send an accused man or woman back to prison to await a pardon, into the world as a
free individual, or to the gallows").
68. 500 Prisoners Benefit from Royal Pardon, ARAB NEWS (June 28, 2014, 2:11 AM),
http://www.arabnews.com/news/593446 [http://perma.cc/5MJR-MDQV]. The Thai practice of
pardoning is especially common, and noteworthy, in cases involving insults to the monarchy. See,
e.g., Thai King Pardons American Convicted of Insulting Monarchy, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2012,
11:30 PM), http://www.theguardian.conworld/2012/jul/l1/thai-king-pardons-american-insulting
[http://penna.cc/3FJF-LT2S].
69. WHITMAN, supra note 45, at 148.
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Of these two, mercy is inevitably more difficult for Americans to
accept than exculpation, since it assumes the legitimacy and superior
wisdom of paternalistic state officials in a way against which they tend to
rebel. As a result, it can be hard for us to swallow the lessons we ought to
learn from the continental traditions.70 Nevertheless, they are lessons we
must swallow. For if we can overcome our shock and acquire a better
appreciation of the values of continental justice, we will also acquire a
healthy sense of the dangers in our own approach-dangers that are grave,
growing, and too easily neglected by Americans too attached to the idea
that the most urgent danger we face is the danger that a malevolent or out-
of-control state will target citizens who are in fact innocent.
IV. Beyond the American Presumption of Innocence
Nobody is likely to be surprised when I say that the American
approach to limiting state power corresponds much more to the mode of
justice oriented toward the presumption of innocence than the mode
oriented toward the presumption of mercy. We all recognize that American
justice revolves around Packer's "generally accepted ideology of a
presumption of innocence"71: it is a frequently repeated American truism
that "[t]he wrongful conviction of an innocent person is the worst nightmare
to anyone who cares about justice."72 ("Nightmare" is indeed a regularly
incanted word.)7 3 It is also a touchstone of American Human Rights policy
that violations of the presumption of innocence are capital instances of
political injustice throughout the world.74
Not least, it is a commonplace that the "nightmare" of the conviction
of the innocent is a real and pressing danger in America itself. Americans
are used to worrying that state investigators may be biased, overweening,
70. For expressions of American hostility to mercy, see an article by the late Dan Markel:
Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1422, 1478-79 (2004), and Robinson, supra note 6. One
is inclined to cry out in response, with Camille Desmoulins, "[P]ourquoi la cldmence seroit-elle
devenue un crime dans la Rdpublique? [Why has mercy become a crime in the Republic?]"
CAMILLE DESMOULINS, LE VIEUX CORDELIER 124 (Albert Mathiez eds., 1936) (Fr.).
71. Packer, supra note 1, at 11.
72. H. Patrick Furman, Wrongful Convictions and the Accuracy of the Criminal Justice
System, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2003, at 1, 11.
73. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONs Go WRONG 243 (2011) (quoting North Carolina Governor Mike Easley asserting
that an innocent person in jail is law enforcement's "greatest nightmare").
74. See WHITMAN, supra note 45, at 77-78 (explaining how Americans generally view
"investigatory custody," which allows investigating magistrates to hold suspects for extended
periods of time with few procedural checks, as unfair, harsh, and nearly tyrannical).
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indifferent to our privacy interests, racist, or at the very least dangerously
incompetent; while the jury, which is supposed to serve as our bulwark
against state malfeasance, may all too easily be manipulated by the
adversarial prosecutors determined to win cases.
And Americans may well be right to worry. It is undoubtedly the case
that the overwhelming bulk of accused persons in America are guilty; most
cops and most prosecutors are decent people doing their best at tough jobs;
and in the vast majority of cases that result in charges, it is perfectly
obvious who the culprit is. Nevertheless, it is a fair guess that more
innocents are convicted in America than in continental Europe. That is the
implication of work like Brandon Garrett's 2011 book Convicting the
Innocent, which reconstructs how more than two hundred American
defendants whose innocence was later proved through DNA evidence were
initially convicted.7 6 Our underprofessionalized, politicized, procedurally
haphazard system, so effectively described by Garrett, almost certainly
produces more wrongful convictions than the more highly professionalized
and non-adversarial continental systems do.77 (There are also doctrinal
reasons why the common law, and in particular the American common law,
lends itself to wrongful convictions more than continental law does.)78 For
those reasons alone, it is understandable that the presumption of innocence
should feature peculiarly prominently in the American idea of justice.
There is another reason as well: roughly 95% of American cases are
resolved by plea bargain.79  The inevitable consequence is that the tiny
percentage of cases that go to trial involve a heavy disproportion of
75. See generally, e.g., Victor Gold, Psychological Manipulation in the Courtroom, 66 NEB.
L. REv. 562 (1987) (discussing how evidence can be manipulated to affect the jury's perception
and the ultimate outcome of the case).
76. See generally GARRETT, supra note 73. Other work in the same vein is surveyed in
Christopher Slobogin, Lessons from Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. L. REv. 699, 704-06 (2014).
77. Our "trust in the [common law] trial process," as Garrett delicately concludes, "may have
been misplaced." GARRETT, supra note 73, at 260. For the contrast with the continental tradition
of fact-finding, with its repeated vetting of the dossier, see the discussion in Part V, infra.
78. We know that wrongful convictions are very frequently the result of false confessions.
Yet in the continental world, a confession uncorroborated by other evidence is insufficient to
sustain a conviction. See the discussion in Lissa Griffin, Can "Real" Corroboration
Requirements Prevent Wrongful Convictions?, COMP. L. PROF BLOG (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/comparativelaw/2014/03/can-real-corroboration-requirements-
prevent-wrongful-convictions.html [http://perma.cc/5XQA-JYED]. Historically the common law
used the corpus delicti rule, which required at least hard evidence that he crime to which the
defendant had confessed had in fact been committed; but even the corpus delicti rule has been
generally abandoned in the United States. For a recent example, see the Etan Patz case. James C.
McKinley Jr., Confession in Etan Patz Case Can Be Used at Trial, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/nyregion/confession-in-etan-patz-case-can-
be-used-at-trial-judge-rules.html [http://perma.cc/6MHN-WDB9]. Given all we know about false
confessions, this is a reprehensible development.
79. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 53, at 1.
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defendants with colorable claims of innocence.80  Anybody whose
understanding of the nature of criminal justice is formed by witnessing trial
in modem America will naturally conclude that innocent persons are
frequently accused.
For those reasons, and because the presumption of innocence fits so
comfortably within an antistatist, classic liberal sensibility, it is unsurprising
that the American idea of justice revolves heavily around the presumption
of innocence. We fear, understandably, that evils will transpire in the
American investigative process; we share a cultural sensibility that
imagines that the state is out to get us; and, committed to forestalling the
conviction of the innocent and more broadly to preserving liberty, we
agree-on both the American left and the American right-that we must
make it difficult for the state to prove its case and difficult for the state to
blacken the jury's perception of the defendant.8 '
In particular, we embrace Packer's "obstacle course" model of due
82* ***process. The core institutions for limiting state power, on this American
"obstacle course" understanding, have to do with evidence: they are the
Fourth Amendment, permitting the suppression of illegally gathered
evidence, and the admissibility rules of trial evidence, permitting the
exclusion of all that might be prejudicial.8 3  The "obstacle course" also
includes other practices intended to combat the risk of juror prejudice, such
as elaborate voir dire and the occasional transfer of a highly publicized case
to a less prejudicial venue.84 This American system has plenty of critics
and skeptics. But by and large it commands tremendous support. Our
culture of the presumption of innocence seems to Americans, left and right,
one of the glories of our tradition of safeguarding civil liberties, celebrated
in Supreme Court opinions and television shows alike." Our concern with
80. Consider the analogous result in the civil context. Cf George Priest & Benjamin Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-6 (1984) (explaining that in the
civil context, cases that go to trial are the ones in which the verdict is difficult to predict).
81. See Packer, supra note 1, at 14-15 (outlining a model of criminal process that stresses the
possibility of error, insists on formal adjudicative fact-finding, and rejects efficiency in favor of
increased protection for the factually innocent).
82. Packer, supra note 1, at 13.
83. See Mark E. Cammack, The Rise and Fall of the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule in the
United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 632-33 (2010) (discussing the function of the exclusionary
rule regarding the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments); infra notes 122-25 and accompanying
text on the law of evidence.
84. Voir dire of the American kind is unknown in Europe. For the selection of jurors in
France, see, for example, MICHtLE-LAURE RASSAT, TRAITE DE PROCEDURE PtNALE 118-20
(2001) (Fr.) (outlining the jury selection process in France).
85. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary,
and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.").
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the fate of innocents who are unjustly targeted looms as large in Hollywood
as it does in the law, and it pervaded American reactions to the Amanda
86Knox case.
But our concerns are emphatically concerns for the innocent. Once an
American defendant has been properly convicted, and consigned to the
class of the guilty, American law affords startlingly few protections-few
limits on proportionality in punishment, few mechanisms for intervening in
the management of prisons, few rights of reintegration after release." Nor
is it only our law that turns on protections for the innocent. The same is
true of our political culture. There is growing opposition to the death
penalty in America, for example.88 But it is opposition predicated primarily
on the fear that innocent persons might be executed, not on the idea,
common in Europe, that there might be something wrong about execution
as such.89 Our fundamental concerns are concerns for the innocent, not the
guilty, who seem to us to have forfeited their rights by committing an act
prohibited by a law passed through proper democratic processes. There is a
deep-seated tendency in America to regard "offenders who break the social
contract and violate our criminal laws"90 as persons who have lost the
protections that law-abiding citizens are entitled to expect.
This American "ideology of a presumption of innocence" does not
reign in the continental countries. This is not, let me rush to say, because
the inquisitorial tradition does not have its own version of the presumption
of innocence. It does. In fact, the continental commitment to the
presumption of innocence is much older than ours: proudly though
Americans may celebrate the presumption of innocence today, the truth is
that it was formally endorsed by the American Supreme Court only in
1895.92 On the Continent, by contrast, the presumption of innocence can be
traced back deep into the Middle Ages: "every person must be presumed
86. Mirabella, supra note 33, at 231.
87. I have surveyed many of the differences between American and continental European
practice in Harsh Justice. The issues include felon disenfranchisement (essentially unknown in
Europe) and the European right to privacy and protection for personality, which are intended to
allow convicts to reintegrate themselves in society despite a criminal conviction. See WHITMAN,
supra note 45, at 84-92.
88. Less Support for Death Penalty, Especially Among Democrats, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 16,
2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/04/16/less-support-for-death-penalty-especially-among
-democrats/ [https://perma.cc/KD7L-JZWG].
89. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The
Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587 (2005) (articulating various concerns with the prominence of
innocence in arguments to abolish the death penalty).
90. People v. Saetern, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 836, 846 (2014).
91. For the classic, and highly influential, modem American philosophical elaboration of this
social-contractarian intuition, see Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 477
(1968).
92. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452-53 (1895).
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innocent until proven guilty" was a formula originally coined, around 1300,
not by a common lawyer, but by a continental one.93 There has been a
continuous and often vigorous continental jurisprudence of the presumption
of innocence ever since.94
Nevertheless there is no doubt that the continental presumption of
innocence is conceived differently from ours. In part, this is because
continental protections for privacy are conceived differently. In both the
American and the continental traditions, the presumption of innocence is
regarded as basic to the protection of privacy. But (as I have argued at
length elsewhere)9 5 Americans tend to think of privacy as a liberty interest,
primarily threatened by the government. Continentals, by contrast, tend to
think of privacy as a dignity interest, primarily threatened by public
exposure in the media.9 6  That difference has a direct impact on their
understanding of how the innocent should be protected. Americans think of
the privacy interest at stake as an interest in being shielded against
government investigators. The Europeans, by contrast, think that accused
persons should be shielded from exposure in the media as well.98 Thus they
regard American practices like the "perp walk" and the casual publication
of the names of suspects as truly shocking violations of the presumption of
innocence. (The treatment of Dominique Strauss-Kahn at the hands of the
New York police is the most recent example: After he was subjected to the
perp walk, there were howls of protest in the press of all the Western
European countries.99 Is there no presumption of innocence in America?
asked European observers.)100
93. Kenneth Pennington, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: The Origins of a Legal Maxim, 63
JURIST 106, 109, 112 (2003). The formula is generally traced to French canonist Jean Lemoine,
known amongst the cardinals as Johannes Monachus (1250-1313). Id. at 116 n.26; see also
Kenneth Pennington, Due Process, Community, and the Prince in the Evolution of the Ordo
ludiciarius, 9 RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI DIRITTO COMMUNE 9, 36 n.90 (1998) ("Johannes
Monachus to Extrav. Com. 2.3.1: 'Item quilibet presumitur innocens nisi probetur nocens, extra.
de presum. c. Dudum (X 2.23.16), extra. de scrut. in ord. fac. c. unico (X 1.12.1), ff. de manumis.
test. 1. Seruos (D.40.4.20) et ius est promptius ad absoluendum quam ad condemnandum.' [A
person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. [X 2.23.16; X 1.12.1; D.40.4.20] And the law is
quicker to absolve than to condemn.]").
94. The early history is associated in particular with the maxim "in dubio pro reo"- "when in
doubt, for the accused." E.g., PETER HOLTAPPELS, DIE ENTWICKLUNGSGESCHICHTE DES
GRUNDSATZES "IN DUBIO PRO REO" 1-6 (1965); see also DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN
AND THE CITIZEN art. 9 (1789) (Fr.); G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, art. II (Dec. 10, 1948).
95. See generally James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
96. Id at 1160-62.
97. Id. at 1161-62.
98. Id. at 1161.
99. E.g., Sabine Sultan Danino, La presomption d'innocence vue de New York en mai 2011,
ce qu'en dit la Loi Frangaise, LEGAVOX (May 18, 2011, 3:02 PM) (Fr.),
http://www.legavox.fr/blog/maitre-sabine-sultan-danino/presomption-innocence-york-2011-
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But the difference goes beyond our different understandings of
privacy. The presumption of innocence simply plays a far less central role
in the "generally accepted ideology" of the continental world-inevitably
so, because the background institutional assumptions in continental criminal
justice are different from ours. Continental law does not start from the
assumption that investigators are likely to be either malevolent or
incompetent. As specialists in comparative law frequently observe, the
continental tradition displays considerable faith in the highly trained,
nonadversarial, and bureaucratically supervised officials who conduct its
criminal investigations. 10' Nor does continental law worry overmuch about
prejudice among its jurors and lay assessors. They too are professionally
supervised. The Continent has mixed courts: Continental jurors and lay
assessors deliberate in the presence of, and under the guidance of,
professional judges, who can be expected to steer them away from
inappropriate avenues of decision making.10 2 The distrust of government
that seems to Americans so necessary for safeguarding liberty is simply
much less present in continental culture; consequently the American-style
presumption of innocence, founded in a reflexive distrust of officialdom, is
much less at home.
Yet if continental justice does not share our "generally accepted
ideology of a presumption of innocence," it nevertheless leaves far more
room than our system does for a presumption of mercy.
V. Trials of Innocence or Trials of Mercy?
With the phrase "presumption of mercy" I mean to capture an attitude
that shapes the entirety of the criminal justice process and not just the law
of sentencing. Sentencing is of course one area where the impact of the
presumption of mercy is bound to be felt. A system strongly oriented
toward the presumption of mercy will naturally have law presumptively
limiting the severity of sentences; and the continental traditions do indeed
francaise-5589.htm [http://perma.cc/B5KT-7UFN]; Die Maxime schrumpft, SODDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG (May 20, 2011, 2:44 PM) (Ger.), http://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/strauss-kahn-und
-die-unschuldsvermutung-kampfbetonte-voreingenommenheit-1.1099639-3 [http://perma.cc/JF33-
MV4R].
100. E.g., Est-on presumb coupable aux Etats-Unis?, SLATE.FR (May 17, 2011, 11:00 PM)
(Fr.), http://www.slate.fr/story/38303/affaire-dsk-questions [http://perma.cc/52RY-TGGZ].
101. See, e.g., Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1413, 1468-69 (2010). For a powerful general account of the comparative strength of
bureaucratic traditions in continental Europe, see John C. Reitz, Political Economy as a Major
Architectural Principle of Public Law, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1121, 1127-31 (2001). For a cautious
statement of faith in the classically bureaucratically trained German judiciary, see Tatjana Homle,
Moderate and Non-Arbitrary Sentencing Without Guidelines: The German Experience, 76 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2013, at 189, 207-09.
102. Thaman, supra note 12, at 245-46.
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have such law.1os But they also display a different conception of the
structure and purpose of the criminal trial and a different approach to the
problems of exculpation and mercy. I would like to begin with those
differences before passing to the law of sentencing.
I start with the structure and purpose of the criminal trial. Consider the
contrast between a system of criminal procedure oriented toward the
American-style presumption of innocence and a system oriented toward the
presumption of mercy. If we share the "generally accepted [American]
ideology of a presumption of innocence," and worry primarily about the
"nightmare" of the state prosecution of the innocent, our criminal procedure
will naturally lay the accent where the American system does: on making a
factual determination of whether the defendant belongs to the class of the
innocent, who must be protected, or the class of the guilty, who are to be
condemned. It will focus on what Akhil Amar calls, in a typically
American formulation, "the basic trial value of truth seeking-sorting the
innocent from the guilty."l 04 A criminal court oriented toward the
presumption of innocence, like the Court of the Last Judgment in a
Romanesque tympanum, will indeed "sort": It will be called upon to
determine whether the individuals before it are to be classed among the
saved, shepherded toward the sheltering right hand of Christ, or among the
damned, driven into the maw of Satan.05
The emphasis on this factual "sorting" function has notable
implications both for the structure of the trial and for the nature of pretrial
disposition. When it comes to the structure of the trial, it makes good sense
that a system oriented toward sorting should separate guilt from sentencing.
It makes sense in particular that it should put the doctrinal and structural
focus on the guilt phase, the phase devoted to the critical sorting that is the
primary purpose of the trial. After all, it is during the guilt phase that he
critical presumption comes into playlos-the presumption of innocence that
forces the court to work hard to justify a conviction. Perhaps it also makes
sense that a system oriented toward the presumption of innocence should
have something like our law of evidence, designed to guarantee that its
jurors/fact finders are not prejudiced or even distracted by evidence that is
103. See infra Part VIll.
104. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759
(1994).
105. For the importance of the Last Judgment in Romanesque tympana, see MEYER
SCHAPIRO, The Programs ofImagery (i): Themes ofAction and Themes ofState, in ROMANESQUE
ARCHITECTURAL SCULPTURE 97, 113-14 (Linda Seidel ed., 2006).
106. See PARK ET AL., supra note 23, §§ 4.01-.06, at 82-88 (describing the burdens of
production and persuasion that a prosecutor must meet and the difficulties involved in doing so).
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not strictly necessary to their narrow sorting task.107 Not least, it may make
sense that such a system should opt for the American "obstacle course"
model of limiting state power, protecting the innocent by making proof
during the guilt phase difficult. 108
As for pretrial disposition, it makes sense that such a system should
display one of the most striking, and troubling, features of contemporary
American criminal justice: a heavy reliance on plea bargaining. After all, if
the purpose of the criminal trial is simply to "sort the innocent from the
guilty," there is little point in going to the trouble of holding a trial if the
defendant is obviously guilty. A defendant who has no plausible claim of
innocence, nor any promising basis for throwing up evidentiary "obstacles"
against conviction, arguably has no business putting the state to the expense
of trying him. Indeed, we might believe that a manifestly guilty defendant
who insists on putting the state to the expense of a trial deserves to pay the
"trial penalty" that American criminal judges notoriously impose-the
harsh sentence, usually the maximum, visited on obviously guilty
defendants who refuse to submit to a plea bargain.'0 9
The trial penalty certainly exists in American justice, as criminal
judges sometimes quietly admit. You take some of my time; I take some of
yours, they proverbially say to defendants.110 In a sense it is understandable
that such a trial penalty should exist: overburdened American judges cannot
hope to limit their caseloads unless they inflict some cost on defendants,
who have the power to initiate trials, and the principal cost judges are
empowered to inflict is the cost of stiffer criminal penalties.
Nevertheless, understandable or not, the trial penalty is a premier
example of how an American system strongly oriented toward the
presumption of innocence finds itself depriving the guilty of rights in a way
that can shock observers from the Continent. How can a country that
makes so much noise about "due process" penalize people because they
have the temerity to insist on their due process right to a trial? The answer
is that our understanding of the purpose of the trial leaves us few grounds
for objecting when judges impose the trial penalty: trial, to us, with its
sorting function, is an institution dedicated to identifying people who are in
107. See id. § 5.04, at 128-130 (outlining some of the potential purposes served by the
general "character ban" in United States courts, including the possibility that juries might be
distracted by such evidence which unfairly prejudices the defendant).
108. E.g., id. §§ 4.01-06, at 82-88 (describing a few of the obstacles set up to make the
prosecution's ability to prove the defendant's guilt more difficult).
109. See, e.g., Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea
Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 91 (2005) (describing the disparity in sentencing between
cases taken to trial and those resolved through guilty plea).
110. See generally Thomas M. Uhlman & N. Darlene Walker, "He Takes Some ofMy Time; I
Take Some ofHis ": An Analysis ofJudicial Sentencing Patterns in Jury Cases, 14 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 323 (1980) (finding that judges impose tougher penalties for jury defendants compared with
bench and plea defendants).
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fact innocent. Its sole purpose is to make sure that those who are to be
saved are extracted from the mass of those who are to be damned. In this as
in so many other ways, American rights are rights for the innocent--or at
least the colorably innocent-not for the guilty.
Now consider a system of criminal procedure oriented toward the
presumption of mercy. Such a system will take quite a different shape, both
when it comes to the structure of trial and when it comes to pretrial
disposition. "Sorting the innocent from the guilty" cannot be the only
purpose, or even the primary purpose, of trial in a system of criminal
procedure founded on the presumption of mercy. On the contrary,
establishing that the defendant is in fact guilty can only be the first step in a
longer process that turns on a very different legal question: how to punish
the concededly guilty defendant in ways that are necessary and appropriate,
but that do not violate the dictates of conscience, and that are (in the
language of contemporary European law) consonant with the demands of
human dignity. To put it a bit differently, the purpose of the trial cannot
simply be "truth-seeking," as so many comparative law accounts of
inquisitorial justice assert. It must instead also be about sentence weighing,
a different (and complex) exercise in legal reflection.
The continental trial procedure that shocks us so much is procedure
that reflects the imperatives of the presumption of mercy. A continental
criminal trial certainly does not neglect the task of "sorting the innocent
from the guilty": the court is obliged to make a careful, factual
determination that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged. Indeed, as
a technical matter the court must make its determination of guilt before it
moves on to deliberation about the sentence."' But a continental court does
its fact-finding in a different spirit from the way fact-finding is done in an
American court, and because the trial has purposes that go beyond mere
factual "sorting," the court has reasons to focus on character evidence from
an early point in the trial onward.
The basic difference between the adversarial and inquisitorial attitudes
toward fact-finding was memorably analyzed thirty years ago by
Damagka.112 An American criminal trial does its "sorting" by staging a
kind of artificial whodunnit during the guilt phase: It asks lay jurors who
have never been exposed to the evidence in the case to arrive at a fresh
determination of whether the defendant is in fact innocent or guilty of the
11. CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PtN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 362
(Fr.), translation at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1958/13719/version/3/file/
Code 34.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C98-TLNX]; DIE STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND DAS
GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ: §§ 216-95, § 263, at 30 (Walter Gollwitzer ed., 25th ed. 2001)
(Ger.).
112. See MIRJAN R. DAMA9KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORTTY 119-25,
160-64 (1986) (analyzing and comparing adversarial and inquisitorial fact-finding processes).
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offense charged.'1 3 By contrast, as Damaika observed, the continental trial
is not designed to make a fresh factual determination in quite the same way.
It does not stage a dramatic whodunnit. Instead it serves a bureaucratic
audit function 114: the continental trial is simply one stage in a long,
routinized, bureaucratic process during which the work done in the case is
repeatedly checked by hierarchical superiors-it is simply one of a series of
decidedly undramatic supervisory sessions in which the dossier assembled
by professional investigators is vetted to make sure there are no errors."'
These continental "audits" happen repeatedly before the trial ever
commences. In France, for example, the dossier must be formally audited
by a panel of judges before the case is committed to trial.' 16 After the trial,
there is provision for de novo appellate auditing everywhere on the
Continent as well.'17
As for the factual audit that takes place at the trial itself: it is certainly
not an unimportant event. Errors are sometimes found; it is in the nature of
the continental presumption of innocence that the trial audit is taken
seriously. Moreover, the panel of auditors at trial includes lay participants,
which is something of considerable value for legitimating convictions.
Still, though the trial audit is important, the working assumption at trial, as
Damaika (himself a former continental criminal judge) argued, is that the
dossier has been put together professionally and repeatedly checked
beforehand."'8 Accordingly, even though the court is technically forbidden
113. Id at 38-46.
114. Id. at 192-93.
115. The errors reviewed in the "audit" may be errors of fact, of course. But it is important to
note that they may also be errors of law. In particular, it is important to note that the
determination of guilt, in the continental tradition, is a legal determination and not a factual one.
That matters a great deal because it means that continental defendants cannot plead guilty. After
all, as laypeople, they may simply be wrong about whether they are guilty or not. (This is by no
means a purely theoretical possibility: the Wall Street Journal recently ran a telling report about a
defendant who almost pled guilty and served time for an act that was later determined at trial not
to be criminal at all. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Federal Guilty Pleas Soar as Bargains
Trump Trials, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 23, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10000872396390443589304577637610097206808 [http://perma.cc/AR79-V4DS].) The
American common law conception of "pleading guilty" is an inheritance from the Middle Ages: it
dates back to a time, centuries ago, when offenses were defined so simply that laypeople could tell
whether or not they had committed them. But offenses are no longer so simple, and it is not clear
that guilt can easily be ascertained in a hurried plea bargain. Figuring out whether the defendant
is guilty may require long and multistage reflection by multiple legal officials. That is a part of
what the continental process is intended to achieve. When the continental dossier is "audited," it
is checked both to make sure that it rests on a convincing reading of the evidence, and that
responsible legal officials have correctly determined that there is good legal reason to deem the
accused "guilty" on the basis of what he has done. Permitting pleas of guilty opens the door, not
only to unjustified sentences but also to unjustified convictions.
116. C. PR. PtN., supra note 111, art. 212.
117. See Damalka, supra note 63, at 489-91 (describing the comprehensive system of
appellate review on the Continent).
118. MIRJAN R. DAMAtKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 206 (1986).
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to consider the sentence until it has made a formal determination of guilt, it
is inevitably the case that the court starts weighing what sentence to hand
down from the beginning.119 Unsurprisingly so. After all, the really fresh
question at trial is not whether the defendant is guilty or innocent. The
really fresh question is what is to be done with him.
Hence this form of trial focuses a great deal, from its opening
moments, on what American law calls "sentencing factors." The large new
question to be resolved at trial is not how to sort the innocent from the
guilty, but how to punish the guilty without "repressive excess."1 20 The
answer to that question will necessarily turn on the individualization of
punishment: It will revolve around evidence of how dangerous the
defendant is, or conversely how much his "course of life" shows him to be a
person deserving mercy or offering hope of rehabilitation. It is beneficial to
emphasize that the process of reflection on punishment will not necessarily
yield a light sentence: the judgment the court makes of the individual may
well be tough and the sentence long. What matters is that continental
procedure is designed to force careful consideration of whether and how to
punish.
The result is a form of trial that comes as a serious shock to American
spectators, as reactions to the Knox case show.12 1 But it is essential to
recognize that continental trials are not unfair-or at least, not
systematically unfair. In fact, the continental form of trial is arguably fairer
than the form we cherish in America. Fairer?! The suggestion that
continental trial, with its casual exploration of seemingly prejudicial
evidence, might actually be fairer than American trial may sound
outlandish, but consider carefully the contrast between the continental and
American approaches. In theory, American criminal trial requires the strict
exclusion of prejudicial evidence from the guilt phase. That is the bedrock
principle we swear by. In practice, however, the American law of evidence
tolerates many subterfuges by which the prosecution can expose the jurors
to damning evidence, and the truth is that jurors learn prejudicial facts about
119. It is of course difficult to persuade continental officers to admit on the record that they
begin considering sentencing before the formal decision to convict has been made in conference.
Nevertheless, in sufficiently convivial settings I have known them to admit it.
120. Cf CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL, supra note 9, at 2 (calling for constitutional oversight
of the penal system, in order to balance the competing interests, avoid "repressive excess" and
limit arbitrariness).
121. See, e.g., Mirabella, supra note 33, at 231 (stating that Americans were outraged that the
Italian criminal system appeared to find people guilty before they were tried); Tom Leonard, Only
Doubt over Amanda Knox Conviction Is Exactly How They Got It Wrong, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 8,
2009, 7:01 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/6763445/Only
-doubt-over-Amanda-Knox-conviction-is-exactly-how-they-got-it-wrong.html [https://perma.cc/
KT9Y-NN7F] (discussing the general view in the American media that the Italian legal system is
flawed based on the Amanda Knox trial).
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the defendant all the time.12 2 By contrast, there is little means by which the
defense in the American common law can offer favorable character
evidence. If the defense puts the character of the defendant in issue, it
opens itself up to a proverbial "barrage" of damaging revelations.123 (For
other reasons too, the tendency in an American trial is to air only
unfavorable character evidence.)124 The most accurate way to describe the
American guilt phase is not to say that it always excludes character
evidence, but rather that in practice it tends to consider only character
evidence that is unfavorable to the defendant.
Continental trial, so seemingly shocking, is different, because in its
consideration of the defendant's character it always gives a hearing to both
sides of the story.12 5 The point of the continental courtroom examination of
the defendant's "course of life" is not just to determine whether the
defendant is dangerous or disreputable-though it most definitely does
consider those issues. It is not just to dwell on what we Americans regard
as "prejudicial" material. Nor does continental law license the court to fish
around in the defendant's life to consider any and all bad acts the defendant
may have committed in his life. The purpose of continental law is to arrive
at a rounded judgment of how much it is right to condemn the offenderfor
the act charged, given all the circumstances of his biography and life
predicament.12 6  Its purpose is to address the fundamental questions that
must be addressed under the presumption of mercy: Is it appropriate to
punish this person, guilty though he is? Are there factors that argue for
122. E.g., Richard C. Wydick, Character Evidence: A Guided Tour of the Grotesque
Structure, 21 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 123, 132-33 (1987).
123. FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(2)(A) ("[D]efendant may offer evidence of the defendant's
pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it . . . .").
124. As I have argued elsewhere, judges have peculiar incentives to permit the admission of
unfavorable evidence, since they know that dangerous offenders whose guilt for the particular
offense charged cannot be proved may be acquitted unless the jury is permitted to see the larger
picture. Moreover, there is one fact about the defendant that cannot be disguised even if he does
not take the stand: his race. James Q. Whitman, The Case for Penal Modernism: Beyond Utility
and Desert, 1 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 143, 176-77 (2014).
125. STGB, supra note 46, § 46 (Ger.) (requiring consideration of circumstances that weigh
for and against the offender-"Umstinde, die flir und gegen den Titter sprechen").
126. See GERHARD SCHAFER ET AL., PRAXIS DER STRAFZUMESSUNG 163-64 (5th ed., 2012)
(explaining that German law insists with particular clarity that sentencing factors should play a
role only to the extent they bear on the blameworthiness of the defendant for the act committed);
Homle, supra note 101, at 195 (discussing the German notion that criminal punishment must be
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime). After conviction there is also systematic
consideration of the character and social circumstances of the offender. See Strafvollzugsgesetz
[StVollzG] [Penitentiary Systems Act], Mar. 16, 1976, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL 1]
BGBI I at 518, as amended, § 6 (Ger.), translation at https://www.gesetze-im
-internet.de/englisch stvollzg/englisch stvollzg.html [https://perma.cc/JG8S-HKDX];
KOMMENTAR ZUM STRAFVOLLZUGSGESETZ 61-64 (Johannes Feest ed., 4th ed. 2000) (Ger.).
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mitigation? Bearing in mind the immense moral gravity of the decision to
impose criminal punishment, do we feel that conscience dictates that in this
case we ought to spare the rod?
Amanda Knox, for example, benefited from the consideration of such
factors, which is mandated under Italian law. It is well worth quoting the
trial court's review of the extenuating aspects of the "course of life" of
Knox and her codefendant and boyfriend, Raffaele Sollecito, as an
illustration of the continental use of the evidence developed at trial. "Apart
from the personal use of drugs," the court found:
[T]here is no other evidence of inappropriate behavior that harmed
others. No witness has reported violent actions, or even aggression
or intimidation by the current defendants against anyone. Rather,
there are proven circumstances in which one and the other, [both
defendants] not only worked diligently and profitably at their studies,
as their status as students required them to do (Raffaele Sollecito was
on the eve of graduation and Amanda Knox successfully and
consistently dedicated herself to her lessons that she attended at the
University) but they were also available [to help] others (Raffaele
Sollecito was supposed to accompany Jovana Popovic to the train
station on the night of November 1st) and undertook the tasks of
gainful employment (Amanda Knox had gone to work nights at Diya
Lumumba's bar) that added to the demands of their studies and
attendance of their lessons. By law these are significant factors
[requiring mitigation of their punishment for the offense for which
they have been convicted].
Both defendants are extremely young, and were still young at the
time of the commission of the offense. The inexperience and
immaturity natural to youth was accentuated by the context in which
they found themselves, different from the context in which they had
grown up and deprived of customary points of reference (family,
friends, long-time acquaintances, their native region and city of
origin) that could have provided helpful support, feedback, and
ongoing guidance in the decisions of everyday life. Thus Amanda
Knox, who came to Perugia not even two months earlier, motivated
only (based on the acts considered) by curiosity and the desire for
new experiences, found herself in a private life without the
protection and sanctuary offered by her family (this consideration
appears all the more significant because of how much Amanda said
about the intense and continuous relationships that existed in her
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'great' family); similarly Raffaele Sollecito, whose father called
continuously, a sign that the son still needed someone constantly to
listen and provide support and guidance; calls, however, that were
inadequate to provide the closeness and control evidently still
needed.127
On the basis of these findings, the court was legally obligated to
mitigate Knox's sentence. It is worth emphasizing how striking that fact is.
These findings, which paint such a touching picture of Knox as an innocent
abroad, were made by a trial court that, in the rest of its judgment, clearly
regarded her as mendacious and vicious (not to mention lubricious).12 8 Yet
Italian law required this court to weigh the interests of mercy-and it did
so, as continental courts all do. The fact that continental courts treat such
"course of life" matters as centrally important from the opening minutes of
the trial may dismay Americans, but considering course of life is not meant
to facilitate the conviction of the innocent by any means; it can work to the
benefit of the guilty, and it contributes materially to the absence in the
continental world of American-style harsh justice.
As for continental pretrial disposition, it too takes different forms from
those we find in America. Because the core purpose of the continental trial
is not simply to invite lay jurors to "sort the innocent from the guilty," there
is not the same systemic pressure to avoid trial for those whose guilt is
127. Sentenza della Corte d'Ass., 4 marzo 2010, n. 7/2009, at 421-22 (It.),
http://perugiamurderfile.org/download/file.php?id=3379 [https://perma.cc/QB7F-SCGV] ("Al di
I dell'uso personale di droga, non sono risultati comportamenti disdicevoli dagli stessi posti in
essere in danno di altri. Nessun teste ha riferito di azioni violente, ovvero di aggressioni-
intimidazioni realizzate dagli attuali imputati a danno di chicchessia. Sono anzi risultate
circostanze per le quali sia l'uno che l'altra, oltre ad impegnarsi con diligenza e profitto nello
studio at quale come studenti erano tenuti (Raffaele Sollecito era alla vigilia della laurea e
Amanda Knox si impegnava con profitto e continuitd nelle lezioni che frequentava all'Universitd)
si manifestavano disponibili con gli altri (Raffaele Sollecito per la sera del 1 novembre avrebbe
dovuto accompagnare Jovana Popovic alla stazione) e accettavano la fatica di un'attivith
lavorativa (Amanda Knox andava a lavorare la sera al pub di Diya Lumumba) che si aggiungeva a
quella richiesta dallo studio e dalla frequenza delle lezioni. Circostanze queste che appaiono
significative ex art. 133 co. 2 n.2 c.p. Entrambi gl'imputati sono giovanissimi e 1o erano ancora di
pifi all'epoca dei fatti. L'inesperienza e l'immaturith proprie dell'etA giovanile erano accentuate
dal contesto in cui entrambi si trovavano perch& diverso da quello nel quale erano cresciuti e privo
dei punti di riferimento abituali (la famiglia, gli amici, le conoscenze coltivate negli anni, il
proprio paese e cittd di origine) che potevano valere a costituire sostegno, confronto e verifica
continui nelle determinazioni della vita quotidiana. Cosi Amanda Knox, arrivata a Perugia da
neanche due mesi, animata soltanto (per quanto gli atti hanno consentito di valutare) da curiosith e
dal desiderio di fare le pii diverse esperienze, si trovava a vivere privata di quella protezione e
riparo costituiti, in particolare, dalla sua famiglia (al riguardo appare quanto mai significativo
quanto dichiarato da Amanda in ordine alla sua 'grande' famiglia, ai rapporti intensi e continui
all'interno esistenti); analogamente Raffaele Sollecito al quale il padre telefonava di continuo,
quale segno della necessitA che il figlio ancora aveva di una presenza che continuamente l'avesse
ascoltato, sostenuto e indirizzato; telefonate per6 inidonee a costituire quella vicinanza e controllo
evidentemente ancora necessari (circostanze significative ex art. 133 co. 2 n. 4 cp).").
128. See infra Appendix.
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obvious. The inquisitorial trial serves purposes that cannot be replicated
through a plea bargain. It serves, first of all, to audit once again the work
that has been done by professional investigators and magistrates. But it also
serves to ponder the weighty and morally challenging question of how to
punish the defendant. Not least, it serves a function important for offender
and society alike: to bring suitable ritual solemnity and gravitas to the
solemn and grave business of imposing criminal punishment.12 9 Indeed, in
the terminology of the Italian criminal justice system that convicted Knox, a
trial is a rito, a ritual.13 0 In a world in which those functions seem essential,
it seems necessary to hold a trial regardless of whether the defendant is (as
most defendants are) obviously guilty.
That does not mean that the continental world never engages in pretrial
or summary disposition. Caseloads are burdensome in the continental
world just as they are in the United States, and there is corresponding
pressure to avoid full-scale trial if possible. Continental law includes a
variety of avenues for pretrial disposition and summary trial disposition,
some of which even go by the American name "plea bargaining."131 But in
line with the presumption of mercy, there is a strong tradition in continental
law of condemning the use of such alternative avenues in cases involving
the sort of heavy punishment hat follows conviction for a major offense. If
a heavy punishment is to be imposed, continental tradition generally holds,
there must be a full-dress trial precisely because imposing heavy
punishment is such a heavy matter.132 There are no life sentences as a result
of continental plea bargains or summary trials. There are only mitigated,
often sharply mitigated, sentences-typically half or sometimes two-thirds
of the nominal sentence for the crime charged.33 (Such a lighter sentence
129. For a classic French reflection on the ritual function of trial, see ANTOINE GARAPON,
BIEN JUGER: ESSAI SUR LE RITUEL JUDICIAIRE 1, 14,20 (1997) (Fr.).
130. See infra Appendix.
131. Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of
Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J., 1, 3
(2004).
132. For the Italian experience, see the Appendix, infra. For the German tendency to use
bargaining for "white-collar, traffic and drug offenses," see JULIA PETERS, URTEILSABSPRACHEN
IM STRAFPROZESS: DIE DEUTSCHE REGELUNG IM VERGLEICH MIT ENTWICKLUNGEN IN ENGLAND
& WALES, FRANKREICH UND POLEN 10 (2011). As this suggests, the practice reflects a larger
tendency to treat nonviolent offenses as relatively less severe. The counterpressures are, however,
certainly strong, and in a personal communication Professor H6rnle suggests to me that under the
2009 German statutory provision permitting sentence bargaining, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG
[STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 257c (Ger.), translated at https://www.gesetze-im
-intemet.de/englisch-stpo/englisch stpo.html [https://perma.cc/59TS-H5WN], she thinks it is
"probable" that major sentences are also handed out and that the sense of the need for a formal
ritual is declining in Germany. She adds, however, that it is "hard to say" whether in fact lengthy
sentences are given as a result of bargains in Germany.
133. Here it is important to emphasize that continental plea bargaining involves only sentence
bargaining, not charge bargaining. The only possible result of a continental bargain is a
downward departure from the notional sentence for the "correct" charge; prosecutors are not
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was given to Rudi Guede, the third defendant in the Knox case.)134 It is a
sad thing that continental justice must resort to these expedients, and a sad
thing that modem societies in general are unable to provide full-dress
justice for all. Still, it is essential to recognize that continental law pursues
its expedients in ways intended to respect the spirit of the presumption of
mercy. If the full formal ritual of a trial cannot be held, in the continental
view, punishment must be lightened.
The continental form of trial that has grown out of all this is deeply
unsettling to Americans. The continental defendant standing in the dock,
interrogated about his "course of life" under the gaze of the jurors, looks to
us like an individual already condemned in a shadowy bureaucratic process,
with no opportunity to rebel. To our eyes, a continental trial seems to rest
on the de facto presumption of guilt characteristic of Packer's "assembly
line" model of criminal justice as crime control: "Once a man has been
[arrested and] investigated . . . then all subsequent activity directed toward
him is based on the view that he is probably guilty." 35  Focusing so
heavily, not on due process; not on whether there has been investigative
misconduct; not on "sorting the innocent from the guilty"; not on
organizing the justice system around suspicion of state power; but instead
on how to punish the defendant appropriately, seems to us to turn justice on
its head. It is impossible for Americans not to think of Lewis Carroll's
Queen of Hearts, crying "Sentence first-verdict afterwards," and
impossible for them not to remember the rest of the passage that follows:
"Stuff and nonsense!" said Alice loudly. "The idea of having the
sentence first!"
"Hold your tongue!" said the Queen, turning purple.
"I won't!" said Alice.
"Off with her head!" the Queen shouted at the top of her voice.36
American believers in the innocence of Amanda Knox were convinced
that they were witnessing just such a looking-glass exercise of inquisitorial
justice, visited on a confused girl trapped in an alien continental justice
system.3 7
permitted to threaten a wide range of possible charges. As a result, the "game" of continental
bargaining is quite different, as is the role played by the prosecutor, who is empowered only to
offer mercy for cooperation, not to brandish an arsenal of threats. It is also of fundamental
importance that continental practice contemplates active involvement on the part of the judge.
This Article is not the place to review the contrast in plea bargaining practice in full, however.
134. See infra Appendix.
135. Packer, supra note 1, at 11.
136. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 158 (1865) (emphasis
added).
137. For a typical account invoking Alice in Wonderland, see MARK C. WATERBURY, THE
MONSTER OF PERUGIA: THE FRAMING OF AMANDA KNox 134-35 (2011).
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And-regardless of whether Knox was in fact innocent or guilty-
there is no doubt that the continental mode of justice carries dangers and
defects. Continental investigators do not always have sufficient resources
to pursue their work in full obedience to the ideals of the law; Italian
policing in particular is troubled by budget shortfalls and turf battles.13 8
The criminal defamation case brought against Knox's parents was
shocking, in my view; it was the product of a continental tradition that
promotes too much respect for professional investigators and that permits
too many means of enforcing that respect through law.139  The Sarkozy
wiretaps went too far too, as many in France itself agree.140  The trial
court's focus on Knox's "course of life" arguably went too far as well: her
initial conviction depended on a troubling mix of circumstantial evidence
and lurid speculation about her sexual proclivities. 14 1 No doubt there are
other cases in which courtroom exposure of the defendant's character yields
injustice. Continental justice is also undoubtedly prey to a disturbing
tendency found to some extent in all systems: the tendency to convict
offenders who seem guilty of something, even if they are not clearly guilty
of the specific offense with which they have been charged.14 2 Not least, as
Americans are likely to argue, the application of mercy inevitably runs the
risk of invidious discrimination: after all, Amanda Knox received mercy
because she was a diligent university student with a supportive family.
Isn't it obvious that that sort of mercy is mercy for well-to-do people, not
for the poor and socially disadvantaged? European-style sentencing
requires discretion, and Americans are sensitive to the truth that discretion
can easily degenerate into discrimination.143
138. BARBIE LATZA NADEAU, ANGEL FACE: SEX, MURDER, AND THE INSIDE STORY OF
AMANDA KNox 51-53, 68-72 (2010).
139. Thus French law, for example, criminalizes disrespectful conduct with regard to
government officials. This offense is denominated "contempt." C. PEN, supra note 51, art. 433-5.
140. Marc Leplongeon, Acoutes de Nicolas Sarkozy: faut-il renforcer le secret professionnel?,
LE POINT (Oct. 2, 2014, 7:25 AM), http://www.lepoint.fr/justice/ecoutes-de-nicolas-sarkozy-faut
-il-renforcer-le-secret-professionnel-02-10-2014-1868564_2386.php [http://perma.cc/US3J
-ZSQE].
141. See infra Appendix.
142. See Mirjan R. Damaika, Propensity Evidence in Continental Legal Systems, 70 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 55, 66 (1994) (noting how the easy access of continental adjudicators to prior acts
evidence that would not be admitted in a common law jurisdiction may tip the scales of justice
against the accused).
143. Classically KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 143-44 (1975), who notes that
the rationale for limiting discretion is not that human beings cannot exercise wide discretion justly
and beneficially, but rather that, no matter the screening, a large portion may be expected to abuse
their power and some of those officers will engage in serious abuses of power. Cf Hornle, supra
note 101, at 201 (explaining how court's regional cultures and other factual non-normative
influences affect sentencing decisions in Germany).
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Thoughtful Europeans too can see the dangers and defects, at least
some of the time. They know that their investigators sometimes slip into
authentically abusive practices: Germans have expressed outrage and
anxiety over their police Trojan horse program, for example;'4 and the
French have been struggling to impose limits on the investigative
process.14 5 The Italians, for their part, have made a sustained effort to
borrow from adversarial procedure.146 Europeans do sometimes worry that
defendants may suffer prejudice as a result of the wide range of evidence
presented against them. In 1993, for example, French reformers made a
serious, though unsuccessful, effort to introduce American-style evidentiary
exclusions at trial, precisely because they believed that the danger of
prejudice was intolerably great.147  The Germans too have a history of
attempts-very halfhearted ones, from the American point of view-to
exclude "course of life" evidence that might create prejudice.148
But it is never right to judge alien systems solely on their excesses and
defects. The right question is not whether systems with a strong orientation
toward mercy make mistakes; of course they do. The question is whether
on balance an orientation toward mercy makes for a more humane criminal
justice system. (And in any case it is always important to remember that
continental sentencing is far milder than American. Injustices are done in
both worlds, but when they are done in America the convicted victims pay a
much steeper price than the victims in Europe.) As long as we keep our
critical faculties alert, we have something to gain by stifling our suspicions
and making the effort to appreciate inquisitorial values on their own terms.
VI. Mercy or Exculpation?: The Nineteenth-Century Divergence
So far I have been discussing our clashing understandings of the
structure and function of the criminal trial and pretrial disposition, but the
divergence does not end there. Our transatlantic differences also have to do
with complexities in our divergent histories of mercy and exculpation,
which have resulted in fundamental clashes over the proper place of jury
trial and criminal law doctrine.
144. E.g., David Gordon Smith & Kristen Allen, The World from Berlin: Electronic
Surveillance Scandal Hits Germany, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (Oct. 10, 2011, 2:11 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-electronic-surveillance
-scandal-hits-germany-a-790944.html [http://perma.cc/SU42-YKW8].
145. E.g., JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT
OF THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN FRANCE 27-29 (2005) (describing
ongoing reforms to French criminal procedure).
146. See infra Appendix.
147. See GASTON STEFANI, GEORGES LEVASSEUR & BERNARD BOULOC, PROCtDURE
PENALE § 2, at 118-24 (22d ed. 2010) (discussing the limits on admissible evidence).
148. HENRI ANGEVIN, LA PRATIQUE DE LA COUR D'ASSISES 375 (4th ed. 2005); HEGHMANNS
& SCHEFFLER, supra note 31, at 673-78; Granderath, supra note 28, at 320.
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As I suggested earlier, the juristic dichotomy between the presumption
of mercy and the presumption of innocence is related to the political
dichotomy between more and less statist orientations. The practice of
graciously showing mercy to deserving offenders-declaring them "guilty
but forgiven"--comes naturally to more statist orders, orders with what
Damaika calls a hierarchical structure of authority; while the practice of
exculpating them--declaring them "innocent," and therefore immune to the
state's punishing power-comes more naturally to political cultures with
deeper antistatist tendencies.149
We must bear those dichotomies in mind as we try to understand how
our Western systems of justice differ. The contrast between American
justice and continental justice is the contrast between two different attitudes
toward mercy and exculpation. That contrast is not a simple or wholly
straightforward one. There are practices of both exculpation and mercy on
both sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, there are telling differences. The
continental traditions, much more respectful of state power and much more
deferential to professional expertise, tend to exculpate in a different way
from the way Americans do; and in the contemporary world, mercy has a
much deeper hold on continental justice than on American justice.
To understand these differences, we must look to history, for they are
the products of two significant historical divergences: one in the nineteenth
century, one in the twentieth. In the nineteenth century, the common law
and continental worlds both rejected the traditions of ancien rigime
monarchical government, which made heavy use of the pardoning power.
Both the inquisitorial and adversarial traditions moved systematically away
from mercy, and toward norms of exculpation: it became a commonplace in
every part of the nineteenth-century West that deserving offenders should
be declared "innocent" rather than "guilty but forgiven." But the common
law and the continental traditions adopted different approaches to that
shared end: the common law put its trust more in the work of lay jurors,
while the continental world put its trust more in the work of professional
jurists. This nineteenth-century divergence was followed by a twentieth-
century one: In the twentieth century, the Continent showed much more
openness to modernized forms of mercy than America did. To understand
the conflicts in our contemporary sensibilities, we must consider each of
these historic divergences in turn.
149. See WHnTMAN, supra note 45, at 14, 92-93 (arguing that the relative power-defined as
the relative ability to intervene in civil society without losing political legitimacy-and
autonomy-defined as a state being steered by bureaucracies that are relatively immune from
changes in public opinion-of continental states promotes mercy in continental society and
criminal punishment, exemplified by the granting of amnesties); see Damaika, supra note 63, at
483-507 (discussing the centralization of authority and the structure in what the author terms the
hierarchal structure of authority); infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text (discussing the
antistatist mechanism of exculpation of the power of the jury to acquit).
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I begin with the nineteenth-century divergence. Before the late
eighteenth century, secular justice everywhere in the Western world tended
to rely on mercy to make distinctions between offenders. Killers and
thieves alike were convicted with relative dispatch, in trials that generally
dwelt less on refined problems in culpability than modern trials. The real
action came after the formal conviction when offenders pled for mercy,
usually addressing themselves to the pardoning power of the prince.150
Their pleas for mercy often involved their life circumstances and record of
good deeds-the sorts of things that are now considered when a continental
court investigates the "course of life" of the defendant. But they also
sometimes included claims that we would now think of as sounding in
justification or claiming involuntariness-claims that in a system oriented
toward culpability might have resulted in acquittal.5 1
Inevitably these systems made heavy use of strict and vicarious
liability. 152 Eighteenth-century criminal law throughout the Western world
was designed to facilitate rapid and easy conviction. In particular, it was
designed to deal with what seemed to many observers the most pressing
problem of criminal justice: highway robbery, a group offense.153  As a
result, eighteenth-century secular criminal law made few fine distinctions in
its doctrines of mens rea.15 4 Open-ended doctrines of liability made it easy
to capture dangerous offenders who might otherwise go free for want of
clear evidence of intent. Doctrines of vicarious liability in particular made
it easy to capture group offenders like highway robbers.
150. In France, the technically princely pardoning power had largely been assumed by the
cours souveraines. See generally Bernard Schnapper, Les Peines Arhitraires du XIII Au XVIII
Siecle (Doctrines Savantes et Usages Francais), 41 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHEDENIS
237 (1973) (explaining that offenders could plead for mercy from a lord after being convicted).
There is much more to say about the use of premodern grace than I can explore here. See
especially Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE:
CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975); the
critique of John Langbein, Albion's Fatal Flaws, PAST & PRESENT, Feb. 1983, at 96; and my
comments at WHITMAN, supra note 45, at 260 n.46. For the deeper religious tradition behind this,
see generally ROBERT JACOB, LA GRACE DES JUGES: L'INSTITUTION JUDICIAIRE ET LE SACRt EN
OCCIDENT (2014), exploring the impact of religion on the justice system of Medieval Europe; and
Thomas J. McSweeney, The King's Courts and the King's Soul: Pardoning as Almsgiving in
Medieval England, 40 READING MEDIEVAL STUD. 59 (2014).
151. For the presence of culpability questions in pardoning practice in the English eighteenth
century, see BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at * 188; and for the Middle Ages, now the research of
Kamali, supra note 67, at 14-24. This question deserves more careful and extensive investigation.
152. BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at *293-95.
153. See John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the
Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 84-85 (1983) (discussing how highway robbery and other
gang offenses "most tested the primitive law enforcement capacity of the day").
154. See Frances Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1006 (1932) (observing
that criminal culpability in the eighteenth century was based on the defendant's ability to
distinguish good from evil).
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The most familiar example of such a pre-nineteenth-century system, to
American readers, is the eighteenth-century English common law: despite
the availability of jury trial, eighteenth-century English offenders were
regularly convicted in rapid trials, but then applied to the king for pardons.
Royal pardons were then regularly granted, and the statutory penalty that
guilty offenders faced--ordinarily death-was regularly commuted into
transportation to the American colonies.s1 5  Comparable systems, putting
the accent on pardoning, existed everywhere in the Western world.'15 6
The latter part of the eighteenth century, however, saw a large-scale
reaction against his routine recourse to monarchical mercy, and in that
reaction we see the making of the two strains of modem Western criminal
law. The reaction, which swept up figures like Beccaria, Kant, and many
lesser known writers, was closely associated with the spread of
republicanism, and it reflected a spirit of hostility toward monarchical rule.
The exercise of the pardoning power was central to the maintenance of
monarchical legitimacy, and it belonged to a hierarchical order in which
justice descended de haut en bas, in which social superiors graciously
condescended to show favor to some of their subjects. Kant gave
expression to the distaste that many of his late eighteenth-century
contemporaries felt for such forms of discretionary monarchical justice:
"The right15 7 of pardoning offenders (ius aggratiandi) whether through
mitigating or wholly commuting their punishment, is probably the greasiest
of all the rights of the sovereign, used to burnish the glory of his majesty,
while doing injustice of a high order."158 It was in the nature of mercy that
it was accorded to some but not all, and that it was used to reinforce
monarchical legitimacy. This was a form of "injustice," a violation of
fundamental norms of equality. The proper alternative, from the point of
view of reformers of the period, was a law firmly oriented toward
exculpation. Indeed, it was difficult for them to imagine a society that was
155. J. M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-1800, at 470-519 (1986).
For further references, see, for example, ALLYSON N. MAY, THE BAR AND THE OLD BAILEY,
1750-1850, at 13 (2003).
156. For the central European tradition, and the shift in the nineteenth century, see H. Krause,
Gnade, in 1 HANDWORTERBUCH ZUR DEUTSCHEN RECHTSGESCHICHTE 1714 (1971).
157. The term Recht here is of course ambiguous, conveying both "law" and "right."
158. IMMANUEL KANT, DIE METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN § 49-E(II), at 165 (Karl Vorlander ed.,
Felix Meiner 1922) (1797) ("Das Begnadigungsrecht ... fir den Verbrecher, entweder der
Milderung oder ginzlichen Erfassung der Strafe, ist wohl unter allen Rechten des Souverans das
schlilpfrigste, urn den Glanz seiner Hoheit zu beweisen, und dadurch doch im hohen Grade
unrecht zu tun."). For Voltaire's more essayistic, and far less radical, condemnation, see Letter
12402: Voltaire to Jean Baptiste Jacques Aie de Beaumont, 26, Sept. 1765, in 59 VOLTAIRE,
CORRESPONDANCE 91 (Theodore Besternan ed., 1960) ("[L]es cas les plus graciables 6chappent a
l'humanit6 du souverain. [The cases most likely to be pardoned escape the monarch's
humanity.]"). For the English parallels, see DAVID J. A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING
OF THE ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL TRIAL 1800-1865, at 56-66 (1998).
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based on true respect for republican egalitarianism unless that society's
criminal justice rested on the strict, nondiscretionary application of the law
according to well-defined culpability principles. The republican form of
government had to favor exculpation over mercy.
Reform agitation grew over the latter decades of the nineteenth
century, and it came to a head in the French Revolution and after. There
was a slow, seismic shift from mercy to exculpation that affected all of the
Western systems by 1870 at the latest; just as there was a kind of
"movement," in Henry Maine's famous phrase, "from status to contract" in
the mid-nineteenth century, there was a movement from mercy to
exculpation.159 Call this the culpability revolution of the long nineteenth
century, from roughly 1770-1870. The French Code Pnal of 1791 set the
tone for the doctrinal reforms that would follow, especially on the
Continent. Enacted amid attacks on the royal pardoning power by
revolutionaries,16 0 the new Code put a firm emphasis on fixed penalties and
considerations of culpability that were designed to guarantee that deserving
offenders were acquitted, rather than being convicted and left to throw
themselves on the mercy of the King. As the Code repeatedly insisted, in
cases of unintentional or justified homicide, "il n'existe point de crime,"
there simply exists no crime.161  Deserving republican offenders were
innocents, not guilty candidates for royal forgiveness.162  As for
undeserving offenders: they were to be punished in the full measure
specified by the law, without hope of pardon.
Over the next eighty years, the old traditions of princely mercy went
into steady decline throughout the Western world, while the accent shifted
increasingly toward exculpation. This is not the place to trace this highly
variable and complex process of change, which was connected with the
spread of jury trial in Europe, the persistence of royal grace in England, and
many other factors, in full. (Much of the complexity of that process is on
view in a great transitional case that we all teach, R v. Dudley and
Stephens,'6 3 in which the court discoursed at length on problems in
culpability, while the defendants still benefited, as late as 1884, from a
royal pardon.164) What I would like to emphasize is that the process was
159. Alan Cusack, From Exculpatory to Inculpatory Justice: A History of Due Process in the
Adversarial Trial, 2 LAW, CRIME & HIST., no. 2, 2015, at 1, 20.
160. Among many examples, see Jacques Jallet, Sur la peine de mort, L'ESPRIT DES
JOURNAUX, FRAN401S ET ETRANGERS, March, 1791, at 172 (Fr.).
161. Loi du 25 septembre, 6 octobre 1791 Code P6nal [Penal Code of 1791], 3 COLLECTION
COMPLtTE, DtCRETS, ORDONNANCES, REGLEMENTS ET AVIS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT (DUVERGIER &
BOCQUET) [DUv. & BOC.], 1834, p. 352, pt. II, tit. It, § 1, art. 1, at 361 (Fr.).
162. Yes, I know that France was not a republic in 1791. Nevertheless, the drive to introduce
republican norms into the law was strong.
163. R v. Dudley & Stephens [1884] 14 QB 273 (Eng.).
164. Id. at 279, 281-88.
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largely complete by around 1870, and that it took significantly different
forms in the common law and continental worlds-the different forms that
we now find mutually shocking.
Continental jurists, following the lead established in the late eighteenth
century, made a systematic century-long effort to establish rigorous
principles of culpability. We see such efforts throughout the Continent.165
In particular, we see jurists systematically working to eliminate one aspect
of pre-nineteenth-century secular criminal law that seemed to them highly
objectionable: the presence of forms of strict and vicarious liability.
Offenders were to be convicted strictly for the commission of acts they
themselves had provably committed intentionally, or perhaps through
narrowly defined forms of culpable negligence.16 6 No forms of strict or
vicarious liability could be tolerated in a properly conceived system of
criminal justice in an age of limits on state power.
The effect of the culpability revolution on Anglo-American common
law was different. The common law is much more substantively
conservative than the continental traditions, and it never witnessed any
comparably successful systematic effort to eliminate strict and vicarious
liability. As one New York lawyer wrote in 1852, explaining a doctrine
that would have seemed inexplicable to continental lawyers who were eager
to eliminate the irrationalities of the past, "there can be no doubt that
whatever was a felony at common law . .. is still indictable as such."67 To
be sure, there were some serious efforts to work out culpability doctrines in
the common law, especially in the latter part of the century.168
Nevertheless, the systematic drive that is always present in continental law
165. Among many examples, two more or less at random from the mid-1850s include C.J.
AMECKE, DAS PREUBISCHE STRAFRECHT 52 (1853) (Ger.) (describing questions the court should
consider about culpability, such as the whether the defendant began the act without responsibility
or whether other reasons to exclude certain punishments are present); E. TRtBUTIEN, COURS
ELtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CRIMINEL 91-92 (1854) (Fr.).
166. See James Fitzjames Stephen's assessment of the differences between nineteenth-century
English and continental (here French) homicide law, in 3 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 91-107 (1883). I have traced this process in outline in
James Q. Whitman, The Transition to Modernity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW
84 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hdrnle eds., 2014), and argued there that the nineteenth-century
analysis of culpability was ultimately borrowed from the Church. Once again, it is important to
observe that there are inevitable complexities that cannot be discussed here, notably in the law of
complicity.
167. OLIVER LORENZO BARBOUR, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 19 (2d ed. 1852). Barbour continued, describing the critical nature of the nineteenth-
century transition to modernity: "But ... all punishments prescribed by the common law ... are
prohibited." Id.
168. Above all, see generally STEPHEN, supra note 57, which continues to set the terms for
much of our treatment of the criminal law. Despite the work of Stephen, it has to be said that it
can be a struggle to extract criminal law doctrine from most of the nineteenth-century literature,
which generally hews closely to statute and precedent and is overwhelmingly oriented toward jury
procedures.
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was, as always, less present in the common law world; the vague and casual
doctrinal approach to culpability of the eighteenth century persisted, in
offenses like conspiracy and felony murder.16 9
Needless to say, though, that does not mean that the nineteenth-century
common law world had no commitment to limiting the historic power of
monarchical government. It most certainly did. But instead of developing
rigorous culpability doctrines, the nineteenth-century common law invested
heavily in a mechanism of exculpation with a long antistatist history: the
power of the jury to acquit. Especially since the latter part of the
seventeenth century, the jury had exercised the power to acquit by giving
the general verdict of "not guilty." 70 The nineteenth-century common law
made much of that tradition: Every common law jurisdiction in the
nineteenth century gloried in jury trial.'7 '
But of course the common law habit of glorying in the institution of
jury trial has always been accompanied by an undertone of distrust for the
persons who actually serve as jurors, and that distrust influenced
nineteenth-century developments too. It expressed itself in the rise of the
modern form of bifurcation of the criminal trial and the modern law of
evidence allied with it.
Before the middle decades of the nineteenth century, there was no
practice of limiting the guilt phase to narrow evidentiary questions about
the culpability of the defendant for the act charged. On the contrary, well
into the early nineteenth century, the conduct of the guilt phase permitted
the jurors to hear freewheeling and wide-ranging discussion of the prior
history and course of life of the defendant, of the kind that still exists in
continental law. Additionally, into the early nineteenth century, defendants
commonly faced what Bruce Smith describes as a statutory presumption of
guilt;1 72 and what deserving offenders hoped for was primarily the
recommendation of a royal pardon.17 3 Only over the period from 1820 to
169. STEPHEN, supra note 166, at 91.
170. E g., Bushell's Case (1670), 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (standing as a famous example of a
seventeenth-century jury returning a not guilty verdict to effect an acquittal).
171. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
251 (1993) (observing that in early American history, "the official theory exalted trial by jury,"
and noting that as America expanded westward, jury trials replaced existing territorial methods for
handling crimes); Michael Chesterman, Criminal Trial Juries in Australia: From Penal Colonies
to a Federal Democracy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1999, at 69, 71 (noting that the first
states of the Commonwealth of Australia all adopted the jury trial).
172. Bruce P. Smith, The Presumption of Guilt and the English Law of Theft, 1750-1850, 23
LAW & HIST. REV. 133, 135 (2005).
173. See Anat Horovitz, The Emergence of Sentencing Hearings, 9 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y
271, 276 (2007) (describing the importance of evidence heard during trial in judicial
recommendations for royal pardons). For the character of pre-nineteenth-century trial, see
generally the fundamental work of Langbein, supra note 57, his magisterial JOHN H. LANGBErN,
THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (2003), and the description in MAY, supra note
155, at 21. For the critique of Langbein as overstating the extent to which the modem form of
2016] 973
Texas Law Review
1870 or so did the modem form of common law bifurcation take hold.
During those decades, while continental jurists were engaged in elaborating
strictly ordered conceptions of culpability, the common law was elaborating
its own strictly ordered law of evidence, designed to limit the focus of the
jury trial exclusively to the offense charged.174
The result, by 1870 or so, was a profound divergence in Western
understandings of the demands of justice. In the common law countries it
came to seem self-evident orthodoxy that "prejudicial" evidence should be
generally excluded from the guilt phase, in order that the procedural focus
on the question of the defendant's culpability should be untainted.
Acquittal, however, was to come in the opaque form of the general verdict,
with no careful reason-giving by the jury. The Continent, by contrast,
insisted on rigorous doctrinal attention to questions of culpability. It is not
overly schematic to say that where the common law put its faith in lay
jurors, the Continent put its faith in trained jurists.
The common law and the continental traditions were thus both
revolutionized over the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, but in
ways that today seem mutually alien and mutually shocking. The two
systems seem mutually shocking for a reason that deserves some emphasis.
While both the common law and the continental traditions theoretically
shifted all the emphasis to questions of culpability in the nineteenth century,
in practice both evolved in such a way as to leave room for considerations
of defendant dangerousness. The Continent embraced strict forms of
substantive culpability, but at the same time it left procedural room for the
court to consider damning evidence. Hence the dismay of common law
observers of a continental trial, who see a system that is far too procedurally
open to the taint of "prejudicial" considerations of the dangerousness of the
defendant. But the common law approach that emerged by 1870 is equally
dismaying to continentals. For while the common law excludes prejudicial
evidence, at least in theory, it leaves doctrinal room, through its seemingly
atavistic doctrines of strict and vicarious liability, for the conviction of
dangerous offenders who might have escaped liability under the stricter
adversarial trial had already emerged by the end of the eighteenth century, however, see CAIRNS,
supra note 158, at 54.
174. See, e.g., MAY, supra note 155, at 109 (noting the development and use of evidentiary
rules to focus the scope of jury trials on the offense at hand). For the continuing heavy reliance on
character witnesses into the 1830s, see id. at 108-09, and for the shift in the later nineteenth
century, see Whitman, supra note 124, at 177 n.151.
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continental doctrinal regime.17 Both systems developed in ways that serve
the same functional need176 : both evolved to permit sub rosa consideration
of the dangerousness of the defendant. But the two systems serve that
function in ways that are alien to each other, and alienating as well.
VII. Mercy or Exculpation?: The Modem Divergence
Many of our differences thus took shape by 1870. Nevertheless we
must carry the story into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to get a full
sense of how the "generally accepted [American] ideology of a presumption
of innocence" sets our system of criminal justice apart from those of the
Continent.17 7 For if the continental systems had moved strongly toward a
norm of exculpation by 1870, in subsequent decades they have swung
noticeably back toward mercy.
In particular, they have swung toward the modernized forms of mercy
associated with the movement sometimes called "penal modernism." Penal
modernism, which swept the Western world beginning in the late nineteenth
century, was a movement for the reform of criminal justice that relied
heavily on the work of penologists, as well as on the work of the caring
professions, psychology and social work. It came to the fore in the Western
world at the same time that modern social welfare state programs came to
the fore, and it had a great deal in common with them. The new social
welfare state programs generally rejected nineteenth-century values of self-
reliance in favor of legislation that tolerated the notion that individuals
might be dependent on government to some degree. In much the same way,
penal modernism departed from the nineteenth-century republican focus on
culpability. The aim of penal modernism was not to declare the largest
possible number of deserving offenders "innocent," thus shielding them
from the punishment power of the state. On the contrary, penal modernist
doctrinal teachings generally made it comparatively easy to convict.
Instead, penal modernism made its distinctions in the punishment process,
preaching the creation of tailored treatments for different defendants-
"individualized" punishments that would take account of the individual
175. It is important to observe that conspiracy law in particular serves this end by loosening
the evidentiary restrictions on the admission of statements of coconspirators. See FED. R. EvID.
801(d)(2)(E).
176. This is an example of functional analysis in comparative law, as advocated by Konrad
Zweigert and Hein Kbtz. See generally KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
177. Packer, supra note 1, at 11.
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susceptibility to rehabilitation or, as the case might be, their irremediable
individual dangerousness. All of these modernist methods assumed that a
healthy criminal justice system was one in which the state took charge of
the largest number of offenders possible.17 8
In that sense, penal modernism was the inheritor of the traditions of
princely mercy of the eighteenth century.179 Prncely mercy focused on the
offender, not the offense, and it put comparatively diminished emphasis on
culpability, instead convicting most defendants while taking a broader
perspective on the prior history and way of life of the convict who pled for
mercy.80 Penal modernism also focused on the offender and took a broader
perspective on his history and way of life.' 8 ' The critical difference
between the penal modernist approach and the mercy approach of the
eighteenth century was that penal modernism, instead of founding its
"individualized" decision making on sentiment, founded it on psychology,
penology, and social science.182  The deep kinship with the old mercy
approach was there, though: to an important degree, penal modernism had
exactly the "neo-feudal" cast that critics ascribed to the social welfare
state.'
During the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, penal modernism
had a profound influence in America and Europe alike. This was a period
of relative convergence in the criminal justice of the Atlantic world, just as
it was a period of relative convergence in progressive taxation and social
welfare state policies. Penal modernist doctrines affected the America of
the Model Penal Code just as they affected progressives and fascists in
Europe. Over the last forty years or so, however, the pattern of divergence
has reasserted itself; today we see an American system that has moved
much more strongly toward exculpation, while in continental Europe,
mercy, especially in its penal modernist incarnation, has maintained its
strength, and even grown in strength.
The most striking example of the continuing growth in strength of the
mercy approach on the Continent comes from France. During the socialist
regime of Frangois Mitterand, France became the scene of a notable
experiment in modern criminal justice, the Nouveau Code Penal, which
entered into effect in 1994 (and which has since attracted much less
178. See Whitman, supra note 124, at 144 (describing the penal modernist argument as one
that advocated for individualized punishment and rehabilitation).
179. See id. at 157-58 (detailing how penal modernist judges are compelled to look beyond
single acts to determine the character of an individual).
180. See id. at 156-57 (describing the emphasis penal modernism places on considering the
past life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities of an offender).
181. Id. at 156-57, 160.
182. Id. at 153-54.
183. See id. at 158-59, 180 (describing the social welfare state and penal modernism as
"paternalistic").
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attention from scholars of comparative law than it deserves).184 As we have
seen, on the Continent the exculpation revolution of the nineteenth century
led to the creation of more complex doctrines of culpability, which
permitted the acquittal of a larger proportion of technically "innocent"
defendants. In France, in particular, it led to the creation of doctrines of
circonstances attinuantes, "extenuating circumstances," on the strength of
which the nineteenth-century French jury could declare the accused to be
among the innocent.
The Nouveau Code Pinal rejected that tradition, eliminating
circonstances attinuantes from French criminal law two centuries after the
French Revolution.186  Instead, the new Code was designed to shift the
weight to the punishment decision, essentially entrusting the assessment of
any excuses the offender might offer to the judgment of punishment
professionals.187  It did not do this, however, in a purely penal modernist
way, nor in a way that simply replicated the old practices of princely mercy:
the offender was not simply delivered into the hands of psychologists,
social workers, and penologists-as is still the case in Germany, for
example. Instead, the Nouveau Code Pinal was designed to juridify the
punishment process, by vesting the supervision of the offender in ajuge de
l'application des peines, a "judge of the application of punishments," seized
of the case upon conviction and called upon to watch over the offender's
progress.'8 8 The aim was to tame the older styles of punishment, whether
founded in clemency or in psychology, subjecting them to a sterner rule of
law. The bottom line, though, was that the French criminal justice system
shifted away from the nineteenth-century logic of culpability, with its drive
184. COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW PROJECT, THE FRENCH PENAL CODE OF 1994 AS
AMENDED AS OF JANUARY 1, 1999, at 1 (Edward A. Tomlinson trans., 1999).
185. For an account of their use in French legal history, see JAMES M. DONOVAN, JURIES AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN FRANCE IN THE NINETEENTH & TWENTIETH
CENTURIES 5-6, 56-57 (2010).
186. Id. at 8-9.
187. RASSAT, supra note 84, at 761 ("Jusqu'au nouveau Code p6nal, toutes les juridictions de
jugement pouvaient absoudre la personne poursuivie s'il constatait I'existence d'une excuse
absolutoire. Cela n'est plus possible aujourd'hui bien que le Code p6nal ait laiss6 subsister en
pratique ces excuses .... [Before the new penal code, all trial courts could acquit the accused
person if there was an absolving excuse. This is no longer possible today although the penal code
has allowed such excuses to remain in practice .... ."); see also COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW
PROJECT, supra note 184, at 8-9.
188. The juge de l'application des peines has a long and evolving history in French criminal
procedure. This is not the place to discuss it in full. See MARTINE HERZOG-EVANS, DROIT DE
L'APPLICATION DES PEINES §§ 21.11-12, 21.21-24 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the role of the judge
of application of punishments before and after the presumption of innocence was instituted). See
generally id. at 92-110.
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to classify a larger number of defendants as "innocent." Instead the
Nouveau Code Pinal tended to make declarations of "guilty" easier,
maximizing the number of offenders placed under the control of the state
punishment system.
During the same period, American criminal law took the opposite tack.
From the mid-1970s onward, the United States showed, as we all know, a
much sharper eversal of social welfare state practices than was witnessed
in continental Europe. (The contrast is nowhere stronger than in the
divergence between the policies of the governments of Ronald Reagan and
Frangois Mitterrand, both of whom took office in 1981.)'89 Criminal justice
moved in a direction parallel to the movement of the rest of American law.
What that meant was a large-scale reaction against penal modernist policies,
and in favor of a return to the culpability calculus.'90  Determinate
sentencing is the most important product of this American renaissance of
culpability. The shift to culpability did not end with determinate
sentencing, though. Recent years have also seen a growing tendency in
Supreme Court jurisprudence to extend the logic of culpability into the
sentencing phase: there is an ever-stronger drive in American law to insist
that sentences should depend only on the measure of the offender's guilt for
the act committed, not on other sentencing factors.191
VIII. Sentencing Practice: Mercy or Rigor?
With that we come to the law of sentencing, an area in which the
presumption of mercy makes itself felt with particular force, and in which
we find some particularly dramatic contrasts between contemporary
American law and contemporary continental law.
Continental sentencing law remains oriented toward mercy. To some
extent, this involves a literal continuation of pre-nineteenth-century
practices. Grace still survives: modern continental republics are the
successors to premodern continental monarchies, and their exercise of state
power still sometimes resembles historic monarchical practices. Until quite
recently, for example, the Italian Ministry of Justice was called the Ministry
of Grace and Justice; just as the main office charged with criminal justice
189. See CHRISTIAN SAINT-ETIENNE, THE MITTERRAND AND REAGAN ECONOMIC
EXPERIMENTS: A LESSON IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 15-18 (1985) (explaining that the French
government played a much more prominent role in economic and social affairs than its American
counterpart).
190. See Whitman, supra note 124, at 145 (indicating that penal modernism began falling into
disrepute as tough-on-crime politics grew more prominent).
191. For developments in the Supreme Court since Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000), and a characteristic contemporary American argument (deeply misguided, I believe) in
favor of limiting sentencing to facts established in the guilt phase under standard culpability
calculus and procedure, see generally Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Procedural
Rights at Sentencing, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 187 (2014).
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policy making in France is still the "Office of Criminal Affairs and Acts of
Grace."l9 2 Clemency continues to play an active part in the administration
of continental punishment. One notable recent example is Jdr6me Kerviel,
the rogue trader who lost 4.9 billion Euros for Socit6 Gn6rale, and who
subsequently made himself a small-scale cultural hero in France by
attacking the world of finance. While Kerviel was on a walk of penance
through Italy after meeting with the Pope, on his way to surrender himself
for imprisonment in France, the French government, under political
pressure, hinted it might consider offering him a pardon. (He refused to
petition for a pardon; was imprisoned; and then was promptly released as a
result of French sentencing norms.)19 3 A great deal of pardoning goes on in
other circumstances as well.
But most of the practice of mitigation in contemporary continental
punishment does not involve the literal grant of grace. There are many
formal legal rules mitigating punishment. There are presumptive limits on
the execution of punishment itself. For example, there are presumptions
that persons sentenced nominally to life in prison will serve only a shorter
term, say of fifteen or eighteen years.19 4  There are presumptions against
imprisonment: where at all possible, offenders are supposed to be fined,
required to do community service, be subjected to house arrest, or suffer
some suspension of privileges.195 There are practices of mercifully cutting
sentences for those who seem to lead deserving lives even though they are
guilty of a criminal act.19 6  (We have already seen that Amanda Knox
192. Direction des affaires criminelles et des grdces, MINISTtRE DE LA JUST. (Sept. 15,
2010), http://www.justice.gouv.fr/le-ministere-de-la-justice-10017/direction-des-affaires
-criminelles-et-des-graces-10024/ [http://perma.cc/J923-YH8E].
193. John Lichfield, Rogue Trader Jr6me Kerviel 'to Surrender' to French Police After
Protest March Through Italy, INDEPENDENT (May 18, 2014), www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/europe/rogue-trader-j-r-me-kerviel-to-surrender-to-french-police-after-protest-march
-through-italy-9392639.html [http://perma.cc/BD6D-7RTM]; Kim Willsher, French Rogue Trader
Jer6me Kerviel Freed, GUARDIAN (Sept. 4, 2014, 11:43 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
business/2014/sep/04/french-rogue-trader-jerome-kerviel-freed-prison-socite-generale
[https://perma.cc/E6HJ-EPWQ].
194. For Germany (15 years), STGB, supra note 46, §§ 38, 57a; for France (18 years), C.
PEN., supra note 51, art. 132-23; for Italian practice, see Appendix, infra. These are again simply
presumptions, which may be varied; France recently saw its third defendant sentenced to what is
theoretically the possibility of a true life sentence. See Nicolas Blondiau, 3e homme comdamni a
la perpetuiti incompressible, LE FIGARO (Jan. 31, 2015, 12:46 PM), http://www.lefigaro.fr/
actualite-france/2015/01/31/01016-2015013 ARTFIG00068-nicolas-blondiau-3e-homme-
condamne-a-la-perpetuite-incompressible.php [http://perma.cc/G86R-VZH6]. There is also
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence requiring consideration of parole after a certain
number of years, which I do not discuss here. See Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-111 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 317.
195. HERZOG-EVANS, supra note 188, § 81.12 (the objective "est d'6viter l'incarc6ration des
condamn6s [is to avoid the imprisonment of convicted persons]"); WHITMAN, supra note 45, at
10; Hrnle, supra note 101 at 190-96 (surveying German punishment law).
196. See, e.g., STGB, supra note 46, § 46 (requiring consideration of circumstances that
weigh for and against the offender-"Umstande, die fhr und gegen den Tater sprechen").
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benefited from such a practice in Italy.) These are all merely
presumptions-they do not necessarily dictate milder sentencing in every
case. (In particular, left-wing critics worry that there is too much reluctance
to release offenders sentenced to life.)'97 But they are presumptions and
practices that are taken seriously in Europe and that regularly result in
mitigation. The tendency is strong to announce a stern nominal sentence, as
a way of expressing public condemnation of the offense committed, while
leaving room for mercy for the individual offender.
These merciful continental approaches to the execution of punishment
are sharply at odds with contemporary American punishment practice. In
America too, there were once informal presumptions that convicted persons
would serve only some portion of their sentence. But these belonged to the
now-vanished era when policies of individualization permitted prison
officials discretion in determining when to release offenders.198  The
determinate sentencing movement that swept the United States beginning in
the mid-1970s undermined those policies. The passage of "truth in
sentencing" laws effectively eliminated continental-style presumptions of
mercy.'99 There is no presumption against imprisonment in American law
either-although the fiscal and moral crisis of mass incarceration has been
driving Americans to adopt a presumption against imprisonment at least for
nonviolent offenders.2 00 As for pardoning: the cultural tradition of hostility
to the pardoning power runs very deep in America;201 certainly it continues
to stir anger as President Obama sets out to revive a meaningful executive
clemency practice.202
IX. Conclusion: Toward an American Presumption of Mercy?
The picture in all of these areas of criminal law is much the same,
whether the subject is the structure of the trial, the use of criminal law
theory, or the norms of sentencing law. The great contrast between the
United States and continental Europe is not the contrast between an
adversarial tradition respectful of defendants' rights and an inquisitorial one
committed only to ruthlessly hunting down the truth. Both traditions are
respectful of defendants' rights. The real contrast is between one tradition
197. E.g., Andreas Bernard, Lebenslanglich, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (Ger.), http://sz
-magazin.sueddeutsche.de/texte/anzeigen/3383/Lebenslaenglich [http://perma.cc/5EYC-9Y95].
198. Ely Aharonson, Determinate Sentencing and American Exceptionalism: The
Underpinnings and Effects of Cross-National Diferences in the Regulation of Sentencing
Discretion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2013, at 161, 172-73.
199. For a sustained study of the contrasts, see generally id.
200. Melissa Hamilton, Prison-by-Default: Challenging the Federal Sentencing Policy's
Presumption ofIncarceration, 51 HoUS. L. REV. 1271, 1272, 1313, 1321 (2014).
201. For the current state of play before the Supreme Court, and an admirable effort to
promote clemency in American law, see generally Barkow & Osler, supra note 5.
202. E.g., Robinson, supra note 6.
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driven by a more or less libertarian fear that rogue government officers will
target innocent persons, and another generally respectful of the authority of
professional law enforcement personnel, but determined to keep the practice
of punishment within decent, civilized limits. The contrast is between one
tradition that puts all the weight on safeguards for the innocent, and another
that reserves much of its compassion for the guilty.
Can we learn anything from the traditions and practices of continental
mercy as we struggle with the current crisis of harsh justice in America? It
would certainly be wrong to suggest that we could simply switch to doing
things the continental way. Societies do not have the option of picking and
choosing among legal traditions. Both of these modes of justice are too
deeply rooted in cultural and political traditions to be casually displaced. In
particular, there is no plausible hope that inquisitorial practices could be
transplanted wholesale into the United States. The continental values I
have described are too alien to American culture. They rest on a tradition
of trust in government that Americans often viscerally reject. They assume
deference to the "scientific" expertise of jurists where Americans believe
that lay democracy should rule. They reflect traditions of hierarchical
mercy against which Americans commonly chafe.
Perhaps most of all, the continental approaches start from a tacit
assumption that Americans find both obnoxious and dangerous: that
accused persons are ordinarily guilty. The American commitment to
maintaining a just system of criminal law is a commitment to combatting
one particular nightmare scenario: the scenario of the conviction of the
innocent. It would not be easy for us to shift to combatting something else.
As a matter of logic, it is of course perfectly possible to have both a
presumption of innocence and a presumption of mercy. Indeed I have
argued here that continental law has both. Nevertheless, the life of the
criminal law has never been logic. The life of the criminal law has been
anxieties, panics, nightmare scenarios, and beliefs that there is some
pressing evil afoot that must be met with stern measures.
For all those reasons there is no prospect that the strong continental
orientation toward the presumption of mercy will establish itself in
America. Moreover, there is a good case to be made that America ought to
have a stronger orientation toward the presumption of innocence, or at least
a somewhat stronger orientation, than continental Europe does. The culture
of continental criminal justice rests on faith in the professional
trustworthiness of officials-and by and large, continental European
officials probably are more trustworthy than American ones. We will never
know how many innocents have been convicted in any country, but it is a
fair bet that there are more falsely convicted people in American prisons
than in French, German, Swedish, or Dutch ones. With that in mind, we
might reasonably conclude that we simply need our "generally accepted
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ideology of a presumption of innocence" more than our continental cousins
do. A powerful presumption of innocence is a necessity in a country with
an amateurish, aggressive, fragmented, and all too frequently politicized
justice system.
Still, we would be less than decent human beings, and less than
thoughtful lawyers, if we were not at least a little shaken by our encounter
with systems more oriented toward the presumption of mercy. Certainly
when we look at the bottom line-the basic measures of cruelty and
harshness that ought to be the test of any civilized criminal justice system-
America does not come off well. We trumpet our presumption of
innocence to the world, but at the same time our own system of criminal
punishment is out of hand. Mass incarceration and other aspects of penal
harshness are among the most depressing and frightening features of
contemporary American life-a great stain on the record of our national
experiment. It is no justification for the harshness of our system to declare
that we are committed only to punishing the guilty. Even if there were not
a single wrongly convicted person in our country, something would be
fearfully amiss. Our national commitment to the presumption of innocence,
dearly held though it is, has done nothing to tame the worst evils of the
contemporary American punishment system. For that reason alone, decent
Americans should be eager to reflect on the practices of neighbors who
show a deeper concern for the presumption of mercy.
And there are glimmers of hope that American justice can find its way
to its own practices of mercy. The sense of crisis is powerfully present in
America, and President Obama's highly visible resort to the clemency
power has forced at least the beginnings of a public debate. Meanwhile, we
do have some doctrinal resources that could be exploited in building an
indigenous American approach to more merciful justice. As Rachel
Barkow has wisely argued, death penalty jurisprudence may point the way
to a changed attitude toward sentencing. The decision to put an offender to
death makes us profoundly uneasy, and the Supreme Court has held that
jurors in the sentencing phase must consider a wide range of character
evidence: there is a "requirement," as the Court declared in 2012, "of
individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious
penalties."203 Barkow proposes that death penalty jurisprudence could offer
a model for our criminal law more broadly, and she is right0: if we can
acknowledge that long prison sentences too are "serious penalties," we can
grasp some of the imperative of mercy even outside the terrors of the realm
of death. The American Bar Association too has called for prosecutors to
203. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
204. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1147-51 (2009).
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individualize the treatment of offenders.2 05 And as this Article suggests, we
can embrace such forms of more individualized, more merciful justice
without being unfaithful to the historic ideals of the American Republic.
Our familiar forms of criminal trial do not date back to the era of founding;
and they certainly do not date back to the origins of the common law. They
are not found in the text of our Constitution. They are a creation of our
nineteenth-century predecessors, and we have as much right as they did to
take a creative approach to our law in the service of the demands of justice.
In any case, we arguably have no choice but to look beyond our
familiar American way of doing things: our mode of justice is facing a
gathering crisis caused by the rise of modern scientific investigation. The
American common law system is all about evidentiary uncertainty: it turns
on the assumption that we can deny ourselves knowledge of guilt-tying
ourselves to the evidentiary mast, as it were. Our Fourth Amendment and
our law of evidence contribute to the same end: they allow us to put
evidentiary "obstacles" in the way of proving guilt. Yet modern technology
is flooding us with so much information that there are fewer and fewer
cases in which we can feel comfortable forcing ignorance upon ourselves.
The same DNA evidence that has revealed false convictions through the
work of the Innocence Project is available in modern investigations;206 more
and more frequently we have knowledge where our ancestors only had
guesses. There are electronic data trails.207 There are cell phones and
security cameras. We live in the astounding age in which the Boston
Marathon Bombers, and many others, have actually been filmed in the
act.208 Increasingly, police officers are carrying wearable cameras.
Encounters between the police and citizens that would once have been
ignored, forgotten or hushed up are now broadcast on YouTube.20 9 No
generation before ours has ever had to cope with so much knowledge.
This rising flood of information is slowly, but inevitably, swamping
our American mode of justice. We have entered the age of certainty, while
our inherited sense of the limitation of state power requires the systematic
205. AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
3-7.3 (4th ed. 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal justice/standards/
ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition.html [https://perma.cc/48D6-B7FY].
206. Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit: DNA Databases for
21st Century Crime Control?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 636, 641-42 (2000).
207. For their role in the Knox trial, see Mirabella, supra note 33, at 244-45.
208. Erin Burnett, Newly-Released Video of Boston Marathon Bombing, CNN: OUTFRONT
(Mar. 9, 2015, 6:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/videos/us/2015/03/09/erin-dnt-feyerick-boston
-marathon-bombing-never-before-seen-video.cnn [https://perma.cc/64P9-NA6R] (displaying a
video released by the U.S. Attorney's Office showing one of the bombers walking away just as the
first bomb goes off).
209. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Raw Footage: Texas Cop Draws Gun on Pool-Party




creation of uncertainty. It is too much to ask that law enforcement ignore
the wealth of available information. The Supreme Court, and
commentators like Professor Schulhofer, are struggling manfully to hold off
the flood, maintaining some sort of meaningful Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that can serve as our foundation for the American mode of
limiting state power. Justice Scalia in particular warned that we must work
to prevent the erection of a "genetic panopticon."210 But we will not be able
to play King Cnut forever, marching out to fight off the sea of modern
knowledge with the antique sword of our criminal procedure. If we want to
have a just criminal justice system, we are going to need an alternative
conception of how to put limits on the state. We are going to have to find a
way to recognize that there can be meaningful rights even in a "panopticon"
world in which we know with certainty that defendants are guilty.
And therein lies the most important lesson we can learn from reflecting
on inquisitorial practice: The continental countries are not "police states,"
but their idea of justice is ultimately different from ours, and understanding
their idea of justice can help us to understand what we most need to
understand-that here can be rights even in a panopticon. Even a state that
knows everything about us can be kept in check if the criminal justice
system insists on rights and protections for the guilty.
Rights and protections for the guilty are what the Continent has and
what we lack. We must make the effort to see the inquisitorial approach on
its own terms and in light of its own values, so that we can have some hope
of learning from it. We are certainly not going to embrace full-scale
inquisitorial justice in America. The point of comparative law, however, is
not to engineer wholesale institutional transplants, but to broaden the
mind-to help us to escape the conceptual cage of our own tradition. In
this case, the point is to help us to recognize that the preservation of liberty
against the investigative state is not the only possible foundation for a just
and free system of criminal justice. We can think differently-and that
matters a great deal, because in the modern world we are going to have to
think differently.
210. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Appendix
The Amanda Knox Case
No continental criminal prosecution has ever riveted American
attention like the case of Amanda Knox, which ended in March 2015 when
her murder conviction was dramatically and unexpectedly overturned by the
Italian Supreme Court.211 In particular, there is no case that has stirred
more American sentiments of rage and distrust toward continental justice,
much of which has been described in an excellent student note by Julia
Grace Mirabella, who gives a sensitive review of most of the key
differences between Italian and American justice.2 12 Widespread American
familiarity with the Knox case makes it an ideal subject for an Article
aimed at the American audience, and in this Appendix, following
Mirabella's lead, I will use the events of the Knox prosecution as a way of
illustrating, and probing more deeply, the problems in comparative law that
are my topic in this Article.
Knox was tried by an Italian court system that has been in great flux.
Italian justice has long been plagued by problems, notably long delays in
delivering final judgments, and in 1988 Italian criminal procedure was the
subject of a major reform intended to introduce adversarial practices
borrowed from the culturally prestigious American common law.213 That
reform did not progress smoothly; years of conflict between the Italian
Supreme Constitutional Court, the Italian Parliament, and the Italian
judiciary ensued.214 The net result, after a decade and a half of intermittent
turmoil, is a system that everybody agrees is some sort of hybrid between
adversarial and inquisitorial and that nobody (as far as I know) regards as
fully successful.
It is important to review some of the details of the 1988 reform. The
reform was intended to bring more efficiency to Italian justice, and in
particular to pare down delays. That may sound mysterious: why would
anybody think that introducing adversarial practices would speed up the
trial process? (The same question can be asked of Poland, which
introduced similar adversarial reforms with the same goal in 2015.)215 The
211. Elisabetta Povoledo, Amanda Knox Acquitted of 2007 Murder by Italy's Highest Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/world/europe/amanda-knox
-trial.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/26KZ-ZRDE].
212. Mirabella, supra note 33, at 241-47.
213. Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM. J. COMP. L.
227, 228-32 (2000).
214. See Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 64, at 447-65 (describing the reactions to the 1988
reform by the Italian Supreme Constitutional Court, the Italian Parliament, and the Italian
judiciary).
215. Marion Isobel, Case Watch: European Court Pushes Poland to Speed Up Wheels of




answer is that Italians were attracted by the American conception of the
purpose of the trial that I described above. Americans conceive of the trial
as serving a banal fact-finding purpose-the purpose of "sorting the
innocent from the guilty." 2 16 As a result, they see little to object to in mass
plea bargaining, even in cases of the utmost gravity. They even tolerate the
imposition of life sentences through a plea bargain.217 By contrast, the
continental world has traditionally viewed the trial as serving purposes that
go beyond fact-finding: the purpose of conscientiously weighing the proper
sentence and the purpose of giving the proper solemn ritual character to the
rite de passage of a criminal conviction.218 From that point of view it
seems imperative that trials be held even for offenders whose guilt is
obvious.
The Italian reformers of the late 1980s blamed the continental
mentality for the defects of their system. They believed that the "ritual" of
trial was being conducted in too many cases-that heir legal system was
staggering under the weight of too much solemn continental formality.2 19
The attraction of the American system was that it seemed to take a more no-
nonsense approach to justice, permitting the quick and comparatively
informal resolution of cases through plea bargaining. So they
Americanized. That does not mean that they were ready to embrace
American justice without qualm. Like other Europeans, the Italians could
not accept the notion that even life sentences and other serious penalties
could be imposed without the care and ritual formality of a trial. When it
came to the most serious cases, they, like other continentals, insisted on the
necessity of a full-dress trial. Nevertheless, the overall aim was to speed
Italian justice up by shaking up the pious Italian belief that justice always
required a proper "ritual." As the principal draftsman of the new Code of
Criminal Procedure explained in 1988, the reform was intended to "de-
mythify" the trial, putting an end to the idea that solemnities were always
necessary.22 0 Many defendants would be dispensed from the full rite of a
216. Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting Criminal
Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2011/12).
217. E.g., Marc Freeman, Delray Felon Pleads Guilty, Gets 3 Life Sentences for Murders of
Ex-girlfriend, Children, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 8, 2016, 1:34 PM), http://www.sun
-sentinel.com/local/palm-beach/fl-clem-beauchamp-murder-plea-deal-20160108-story.html
[https://perma.cc/QYF9-SHUT]; see also McCoy, supra note 109, at 73-74 (describing that plea
bargaining for serious criminal cases began in the mid-nineteenth century and in 2005, 96% of
felony cases were concluded through guilty pleas).
218. Monica Eppinger, Reality Check: Detention in the War on Terror, 62 CATH. U. L. REv.
325, 346-47 (2013).
219. William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafloti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The
Difficulties ofBuilding an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1, 5-6 (1992).
220. Giovanni Conso, Verso il Nuovo Processo Penale, 1988 LA GIUSTIZIA PENALE I 289,
293 ("[L]a smitizzazione del dibattimento. . . .").
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traditional trial. For them there would instead be new "rituals," including
summary process offering lightened sentences and an Italian version of plea
bargaining.22 1
With regard to serious matters, though, trial was still to be held, and it
was still to be held largely in its traditional form. The reform certainly
wrought some fundamental changes in trial. In particular, it aimed to
transform the role of the trial judge, who was to play a more passive role in
a system driven much more by adversary counsel.222 Nevertheless, in
critical respects the reform stayed faithful to continental tradition: It did not
introduce common-law bifurcation of the trial into guilt and sentencing
phases, and it retained the practice of mixed deliberation by judges and
jurors together. As Elisabetta Grande explains the reform:
A single body of adjudicators-consisting of professional judges,
that in the most serious cases sit together with lay assessors-[still]
passes on issues of law as well as fact. Thus, no distinction between
judge and jury as two adjudicating bodies can be made. Moreover,
the same unitary adjudicating body determines both guilt and
sentence. As a result, the trial does not have to be bifurcated into a
first hearing devoted solely to the issue of guilt, and a subsequent
second hearing dealing with the sentence.223
Thus, despite the Italian reform, Amanda Knox was tried in the standard
variant of a continental court.
In other respects too, the reformers left standard continental practices in
place. In particular, they did not eliminate the practice of staging repeated e
novo appellate review. The appellate process is one of the features that sets
continental justice most sharply apart from the common law. The common law
permits only extremely limited appellate review in criminal matters. In a
tradition stretching far back into the Middle Ages (indeed into early medieval
trial by combat), the common law does not ordinarily permit the state to appeal
221. Id. at 292 ("Vi sono i riti predisposti per evitare il dibattimento, come il giudizio
abbreviato, il cosidetto patteggiamento ed il procedimento per decreto penale, mentre vi sono
quelli che anticipano il dibattimento. [There are proceedings designed to avoid the trial such as:
summary judgments, plea bargain and ex parte criminal proceedings, while there are those that
anticipate it.]"); see also Codice di procedure penale [C.p.p.] [Code of Penal Procedure] art. 444
(1988) (It.) (permitting a "guilty plea" application for a one-third reduction in applicable sentence,
provided that, after reduction, an imprisonment sentence does not exceed five years); id. art. 442
(providing for an "abbreviated trial" with a one-third reduction in applicable sentence upon
conviction).
222. The consensus is that judges have nevertheless reclaimed much of the historic authority,
arrogating to themselves the authority to introduce and consider evidence as required by their
Aufldarungspflicht. See Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 64, at 448-49 (arguing that Italian judges
feel more personally responsible for reaching an accurate and just result and have thus sought o
recapture their traditional role in the fact-finding process).
223. Grande, supra note 213, at 228.
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acquittals,224 and of course there is never de novo review, since fact-finding
must be done by the trial-level fact finder. The Continent, by contrast, brings
its bureaucratic "audit" mentality to the appellate process.225 In order to avoid
mistakes of both fact and law, continental law calls for repeated vetting of the
case both before and after the trial. This too matters for Knox: Her initial
conviction was overturned on one de novo appeal in 2011, only to be reinstated
in a second in 2014 before it was finally overturned again.226
Not least, the reform left the fundamental orientation toward mercy that I
have described in place. Italian justice retains its sense of a "paternalistic
obligation to protect the defendant,"227 and standard merciful practices were
never eliminated in Italian sentencing law, trial management, and
postconviction administration.
So the 1988 reform and the subsequent changes, whatever their merits or
demerits, did not by any means introduce the whole package of American
practices into Italian criminal procedure, and the Knox matter remains a useful
vehicle for examining the virtues and dangers of the continental tradition.
I have already spoken, in the body of this Article, of some of the virtues:
The trial court was obligated to consider extenuating offender characteristics,
and it did so, finding that Knox, despite her guilt for the offense charged, was
studious, a dependable employee, and too young and too far from home to be
subjected to a punishment untempered by mercy. (It is worth pausing for a
moment over those findings. Continental law often emphasizes studiousness
and good work habits. When the trial court looked favorably on Knox, it was
because she did not engage in the sort of behavior that continental courts
typically condemn: She did not "play hooky from school" or "skip out on
work."2 2 8  As this suggests, one question that preoccupies continental
consideration of extenuating offender characteristics is whether the
224. At issue is a fundamental contrast between common law and continental understandings
of the nature of double jeopardy. The continental tradition has a strong commitment to a version
of the ban on double jeopardy that falls under the Latin rubric ne bis in idem. However, the
continental tradition regards de novo appeal simply as one stage in a multistage consideration of
the merits of the case, inevitably and naturally including careful bureaucratic appellate review. By
contrast, the common law tradition, with its roots in medieval trial by combat, deems the trial,
originally understood to be a judgment of God, as a definitive resolution of the matter: A
"jeopardy," literally a jeu parti, a "game of even chances," is a combat wager. For the early
medieval background, see JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE VERDICT OF BATrLE 80-81 (2012).
225. Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1109, 1141-42 (2012).
226. David Cutler & Bill Rigby, Timeline: Amanda Knox Acquitted ofMurder, Ending Years-
Long Saga, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2015, 8:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-knox
-events-idUSKBNOMO01520150328 [https://perma.cc/DJT6-C49S].
227. Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 64, at 449.
228. Granderath, supra note 28, at 320 ("Schuleschwtnzen, Weglaufen vom Arbeitsplatz,
Vernachliassigung der Familie, fortgesetzter Alkholmi~brauch oder eine sonstige tadelnswerte
Lebensfithrung im Zumsammenhang mit der Tat. [Truancy, absconding from work, family
neglect, continued alcohol abuse or other reprehensible lifestyles in connection with the crime.]").
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defendant is a dependable worker who can be integrated into a modem
economy.) The trial court's findings of those extenuating characteristics were
affirmed by the January 2014 appellate judgment that reinstated her conviction.
To that extent, Knox benefited from Italian mercy.
Nevertheless, her nominal sentence was not light: The trial court
announced a sentence of twenty-six years; the 2014 appellate judgment
extended it to twenty-eight and a half years.22 9 Those nominal sentences are
comparable to the sentences an American offender might receive; when we
read about them we might think there is not much to Italian mercy. But before
we gasp at Knox's sentences, we should understand how they were arrived at-
and how extremely unlikely it is that she would ever actually serve her full
term.
The length of the nominal sentences reflected the fact that both courts
found that there were aggravating circumstances that balanced the extenuating
factors.2 30 The nature of those aggravating factors deserves some attention.
The trial court, as we shall see, based its judgment on an improbably lurid
account of Knox's sexual life, along with lurid speculation about the sexual
excitement she triggered in others. In line with its sex-focused take on the case,
the trial court found that her sentence should be extended because the murder
was associated with a supposed sexual offense.23 1 The 2014 appellate court, by
contrast, took a different view of the aggravating circumstances. Rejecting the
sexual speculations of the initial judgment, the 2014 judgment extended
Knox's sentence because of what it found to be her efforts to cover up the
crime, in particular because she and her boyfriend spent hours scrubbing down
the crime scene, along with her attempts to deflect police attention from herself
by falsely accusing her employer, an unfortunate African immigrant named
Diya Lumumba, whose hard-won life in Perugia was ruined by her
accusation.232
That 2014 account of the aggravating circumstances is of real interest for
my topic, and it is worth dwelling on it. The 2014 court sentenced Knox to an
aggravated sentence because sh  failed to adopt a course that a system strongly
oriented toward mercy can be expected to reward: she did not admit her guilt
and throw herself on the mercy of the justice system.2 33 It is important to
229. Cutler & Rigby, supra note 226.
230. Sentenza della Ass. App., 29 aprile 2014, n. 9066/07 R.N.R., at 331 (It.),
http://www.perugiamurderfile.org/download/nencini/nencinimotivazioni_2014-04-
29_searchable.pdf [https://perma.cc/73KC-VSLJ]; Sentenza della Corte d'Ass., 4 marzo 2010,
n. 7/2009, at 420 (It.), http://perugiamurderfile.org/download/file.php?id=3379
[https://perma.cc/QB7F-SCGV].
231. Sentenza della Corte d'Ass., n. 7/2009, at 419-20.
232. Id.
233. See Rachel Donadio, U.S. Student Delivers Appeal at End of Italian Trial, N.Y. TIMEs
(Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/world/europe/04italy.html [https://perma.cc/
3M2Y-K9ZB] (noting that Knox refused to admit wrongdoing during her first trial).
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recognize how much she would have benefitted if she had done so. In that
case, she could have taken advantage of the same merciful option taken by the
third defendant in the case, Rudi Guede. Guede submitted to the rito
abbreviato, the "shortened ritual," giving up his right to a full-scale trial.234 As
a result, he was rewarded with an abbreviated sentence of sixteen years. Guede
is a small-time thief, a thoroughly unsympathetic defendant whose case did not
offer any of the extenuating offender characteristics from which Knox profited.
We may assume that if Knox had submitted to the authorities and admitted
guilt, she would have received a nominal sentence of significantly less than the
sixteen years given to Guede. There is a great deal of mercy to be had from the
Italian system; but, like mercy everywhere, it is largely for those who do not
display defiance toward the state.
In any case, regardless of her nominal sentence, it is highly unlikely that
Knox would ever have served the full term to which she was formally
sentenced. Italy, unlike the United States, does not have "truth in sentencing"
laws. On the contrary, there is a statutory presumption that offenders will not
serve out their nominal sentence, and it is normal in Italy to release offenders
after some portion of their sentence has been served. That is true even of
notorious offenders like Mehmet Ali Agca, the attempted assassin of Pope John
Paul II, who was sentenced nominally to life in prison but released in 1999
after only nineteen years.235 Nominal sentences announce the gravity of the
offense to society and the offender; the actual service of sentence is govemed
by norms of mercy.
Did the continental approach prove a failure in the Knox case in revealing
ways? Yes indeed. There are two principal respects in which the Italian
criminal justice system fell significantly short in my view. The first was
flagged by all of the American critics of the Knox case: the trial court's
consideration of character evidence ran wild, as the court wandered off into an
unsubstantiated and overheated theory of Knox's sexual activities. The trial
court faced the problem of explaining the link between Knox, her boyfriend,
and Guede, the third defendant. The forensic evidence suggested that Guede
pinned the victim's arm down with one of his hands, while inserting a finger of
the other hand in her vagina, leaving traces of his DNA. Meanwhile, knives
were held on either side of the victim's neck by two other aggressors, one of
whom fatally stabbed her. In its effort to explain how this strange tableau of
group aggression came to be staged, the trial court imagined the following
succession of events: Amanda and her boyfriend were heatedly making love in
234. See Tom Kington, Court Cuts Rudy Guede's Sentence for Meredith Kercher Murder,
GuARDIAN (Dec. 22, 2009, 1:32 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/22/rudy
-guede-sentence-kercher-murder [https://perma.cc/CVZ8-9FN3] (stating that Guede submitted to
a "fast-track trial" and received a reduced sentence in exchange).
235. Sebnem Arsu, Turk Who Shot Pope in 1981 to Be Released From Prison, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/09/intemational/europe/09assassin.html
[https://perma.cc/ZMM2-XY66].
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her room. This created a "charged" sexual atmosphere in the apartment, and
that charged atmosphere triggered a rape attempt by Guede:
Amanda and Raffaele were together at the house shortly after 11:00
and had decided to go to Amanda's room with the intention being
intimate together . . . . Raffaele Sollecito and Amanda Knox were
always very affectionate with each other when they were together ...
even in the police station [where they were awaiting police
interviews] . . . that underscored the behavior of these two young
people together: they were extremely cozy with each other, they
caressed each other, they kissed each other. An attitude hardly
appropriate to the setting and the situation [of a police station after a
murder] .... Amanda and Raffaele found themselves together in
Amanda's house; they were together in her room and alone as
Meredith was in her own room and Rudi, as it turns out, was in the
bathroom [where he left an unflushed toilet].
It is therefore probable that Rudi, exiting from the bathroom,
allowed himself to get caught up in a dangerous situation charged
with sexual urgings, and yielding to his own concupiscence, sought
to satisfy his own urgings by going into Meredith's room where she
was alone with the door ajar .. .. [I]t seems the most probable
hypothesis that Rudi decided on his own to enter Meredith's room,
and her reaction and refusal were overheard by Amanda and Raffaele
(Amanda's room was very close to Meredith's) who were disturbed
and intervened, as the succession of events and their aftermath
demonstrate, abetting Rudi who they had let into the house, and
became themselves, together with Rudi, Meredith's aggressors and
killers.
Because, then, the two young people, deeply interested in each
other, culturally and intellectually curious, he on the eve of
graduation, and her engrossed, decided to participate in this final act
to force Meredith's will, with whom they'd had, especially Amanda,
frequent and friendly relationship, until they caused her death, again
and again always with an option to make a choice, and this Court
cannot comprehend the choice of extreme evil that was made. It can
be hypothesized that this evil choice started with consumption of
intoxicating substances that evening, which was verified, as stated by
Amanda."236
236. Sentenza della Corte d'Ass., n. 7/2009, at 390-94 ("Amanda e Raffaele, giunti nella casa
poco dopo le 23,00 6 da ritenere che si siano portati nella camera di Amanda con l'intenzione di
stare insieme, in intimith .... Raffaele Sollecito e Amanda Knox quando erano insieme erano tra
loro molto affettuosi ... anche in Questura ... 6 stato evidenziato il comportamento che i due
giovani ragazzi avevano: erano vicinissimi l'uno all'altra, si facevano carezze, si baciavano.
Atteggiamento poco consono all'ambiente ed alla situazione .... Amanda e Raffaele che si
trovavano insieme nella casa di Amanda; insieme nella camera di Amanda e soli poich& Meredith
era nella propria stanza e Rudi, come si 6 visto, si era trattenuto al bagno. E' quindi probabile che
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It is hard not to hear, in this phantasmagoric reconstruction of an
orgiastic murder, the voice of a relatively small-town court, giving in to
prejudices and suspicions excited by an attractive woman who showed
noticeably little respect for local mores. Perhaps an American-style
bifurcated trial might have made this sort of overheated decision making
harder by excluding character evidence-though of course, an American
criminal verdict would have been rendered by a jury whose prejudices
could never have been examined on appeal. In any case, there is a lesson in
the trial court's judgment: the continental approach depends on the
professionalism of judicial officers, and where that professionalism falls
short, dangers loom.
Still, the story does not end there. As Mirabella observes, the Italian
system, unlike the American, does permit the close examination of
judgments on appeal. The trial court's judgment was overturned on appeal
in 2012, and after being reinstated, overturned again.237  The continental
appellate process is designed to correct lapses in professionalism, and in
this case it worked.
One more failing of the Italian system deserves mention. It is a failing
that grows in a paradoxical way out of the Italian style of mercy. One of
the deepest sources of frustration in the Knox case has to do with one
strange fact: there was a witness who was present at the murder, but who
never testified directly to what took place. That witness is of course Rudi
Guede. Why do we not have the eyewitness testimony of Rudi Guede?238
The answer has to do with the merciful options offered by Italian
criminal procedure as reformed in 1988, and it is an answer that shows how
far Italian justice is from the supposed continental commitment to getting
the whole truth through inquisitorial methods. Guede requested, and was
Rudi, uscendo dal bagno, si sia lasciato trascinare da una situazione avvertita come carica di
sollecitazioni sessuali e, cedendo alla propria concupiscenza, abbia cercato di soddisfare le proprie
pulsioni portandosi nella stanza di Meredith che era sola nella propria camera con la porta
quantomeno socchiusa .... [P]are l'ipotesi pib probabile, che Rudi decise da solo di entrare
nella stanza di Meredith, la reazione ed il rifiuto della ragazza dovettero essere sentiti da Amanda
e Raffaele (la stanza di Amanda si trovava vicinissima a quella di Meredith) i quali, anzi, ne
dovettero essere disturbati ed intervennero, per quanto la successione degli eventi ed il loro
epilogo evidenziano, spalleggiando Rudi che avevano fatto entrare in casa e diventarono anche
loro, insieme a Rudi, gli aggressori di Meredith, i suoi uccisori. Perch6, poi, due giovani,
fortemente interessati l'uno all'altra, con curiosits intellettuali e culturali, alla vigilia della laurea
lui e piena di interessi lei, si determinarono a partecipare a tale azione finalizzata a forzare la
volonth di Meredith con la quale avevano, specie Amanda, rapporti di frequentazione e cordialitA,
fino a cagioname la morte, rientra nell'esercizio continuo della possibilitA di scelta e questa Corte
non pub che registrare la scelta di male estremo che fu operata. Si pub ipotizzare che tale scelta di
male inizi6 con il consumo di sostanze stupefacenti che si era verificato anche quella sera, come
dichiarato da Amanda.").
237. Mirabella, supra note 33, at 253-54.
238. Guede did take the stand, and the 2014 court worked hard and impressively to extract
useable information from his testimony. Nevertheless, it had to struggle with hints and scraps of
information rather than the frank confession that would have eliminated all doubt in the case.
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granted, the rito abbreviato, the "abbreviated ritual," carrying with it a
lightened sentence that was created in the 1988 reform. Now, Italy is not
the only country to offer defendants such an option. Other systems offer
lightened sentences to defendants who forego full-scale trial as well. But
when other systems do so, they ordinarily extract a bargain from the
defendant: they grant the lightened sentence in return for full cooperation.
They offer mercy-but only to defendants who give a confession and
testimony against co-offenders. To borrow a phrase from John Langbein,
the procedures in other systems are designed to induce the defendant to
serve as a "testimonial resource."23 9
Not so in Italy. The rito abbreviato, created in 1988, is offered as a
matter of right, and there is no requirement that defendants confess and
cooperate.24 0  Guede has never confessed and does not cooperate; his
statements to the police include an improbable account of the events
intended to deny his own responsibility. He retains his constitutional right
against self-incrimination and can never be compelled to testify differently.
Guede was given the option of a lightened sentence, but the Italian system
is so comparatively unfocused on getting the whole truth that it missed its
chance to use sentencing leverage in order to get the facts. Rudi Guede, the
recipient of Italian mercy, never became a testimonial resource, and that is
the single most important reason why we will never know the whole truth
of what happened on the night of Meredith Kercher's murder.
239. John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at
Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1047,1053 (1994).
240. See Grande, supra note 213, at 254 (noting that the giudizio abbreviato, the "abbreviated
trial," is available to all defendants and only requires surrendering the right to a full trial).
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